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Abstract
This article studies the user behavior in non-atomic congestion
games. We consider non-atomic congestion games with continuous
and non-decreasing functions and investigate the limit of the price of
anarchy when the total user volume approaches infinity. We deepen
the knowledge on asymptotically well designed games [28], limit games
[28], scalability [28] and gaugeability [7] that were recently used in the
limit analyses of the price of anarchy for non-atomic congestion games.
We develop a unified framework and derive new techniques that al-
low a general limit analysis of the price of anarchy. With these new
techniques, we are able to prove a global convergence on the price of
anarchy for non-atomic congestion games with arbitrary polynomial
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price functions and arbitrary user volume vector sequences, see Theo-
rem 2. This means that non-atomic congestion games with polynomial
price functions are asymptotically well designed. Moreover, we show
that these new techniques are very flexible and robust and apply also
to non-atomic congestion games with price functions of other types.
In particular, we prove that non-atomic congestion games with reg-
ularly varying price functions are also asymptotically well designed,
provided that the price functions are slightly restricted, see Theorem
3 and Theorem 4. Our proofs are direct and very elementary with-
out using any heavy machinery. They only use basic properties of
Nash equilibrium and system optimum profiles, simple facts about
the asymptotic notation O(·),Ω(·), etc, and induction. Our results
greatly generalize recent results from [8], [6], [7] and [28]. In particu-
lar, our results further support the view of [28] with a general proof
that selfishness need not be bad for non-atomic congestion games.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Nowadays, traffic congestion has almost become a daily annoyance to every
citizen in large cities of China. According to the newest data from AMap [1]
in 2017, more than 26% of cities in China experienced traffic congestion in
rush hours, 55% of cities experienced low speed, and only 19% of cities did
not suffer from traffic congestion.
Traffic congestion does not only considerably enlarge travel latency, but
also causes serious economic loss. We take the capital city of China, Beijing,
as an example. The average economic loss caused by congestion in 2017 was
about 4,013 RMB per person, see [2], which accounts for 3.1% of the annual
GDP of Beijing in that year. Note that the annual GDP growth of Beijing
was only about 6.8% in 2017. This means that traffic congestion has almost
destroyed one third of the potential economic growth of Beijing.
To alleviate problems caused by traffic congestion, the government of
China has actively implemented a series of traffic management measures in
some large cities in recent years, including the even and odd license plate
number rule, license plate lotteries, encouraging public transportation and
others. These measures definitely prevent further deterioration of traffic, but
not yet completely cure congestion.
Road traffic conditions are a direct result from simultaneous travel of cit-
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izens in a particular area. Given road conditions, the routing behavior of
travelers almost determines how the traffic develops. Thus, to comprehen-
sively cure congestion, a preliminary step is to well understand the routing
behavior of travelers. In particular, we need to find out the extent to which
the autonomous routing behavior of travelers contributes to congestion. This
motivates the present article.
1.2 The static model
To that end, one needs to model road traffic appropriately. A popular static
model for road traffic is the so-called non-atomic congestion game (NCG), see
[18] or [13]. NCGs are non-cooperative games of perfect information. In an
NCG, users (players) are collected into K different groups according to some
measurement on their similarities, for a fixed integer K ∈ N+. Associated
with each group k ∈ K := {1, . . . , K} is a finite non-empty set Sk containing
all strategies only available to users from group k. Every user engaged in
the game chooses a strategy s ∈ S := ⋃k∈K Sk that he will follow, and
every chosen strategy s ∈ S consumes r(a, s) units of resource a for each
a ∈ A. Here, A is a finite non-empty set containing all available resources, and
r(a, s) is a fixed non-negative constant denoting the consumed (or demanded)
volume of resource a by strategy s for each a ∈ A and each s ∈ S. The
eventual price of a resource a ∈ A depends only on its consumed volume.
Given a vector d = (dk)k∈K of user volumes, a feasible strategy profile f is an
assignment that assigns to each of the dk users from group k ∈ K a feasible
strategy s ∈ Sk for each group k ∈ K. See [28] or Section 2 for details.
Obviously, NCGs model road traffic on an macroscopic level. Then, re-
sources a ∈ A will be arcs (streets) of the underlying road network, a group
k ∈ K will be a travel origin-destination (OD) pair, and a strategy s ∈ Sk
will be a path from the k-th origin to the k-th destination, for each k ∈ K.
The constant r(a, s) is just an indicator function of the membership relation
“a ∈ s” for each arc a ∈ A and each path s ∈ S. A feasible strategy profile
f is then a feasible traffic (path) assignment [10] for all the T (d) :=
∑
k∈K dk
travelers. As our results hold on a more general level, we will not stick to
these terminologies of road traffic in the sequel, but still be able to under-
stand the routing behavior of travelers.
In an NCG, the price of a resource a ∈ A is often expressed as an non-
negative, non-decreasing and continuous function τa(·) of its demanded vol-
ume, see, e.g., [19], [20], [22], [13], [23]. Popular price functions are polyno-
mials. For instance, latency functions τa(·) in road traffic are conventionally
3
assumed to be Bureau of Public Road (BPR) functions [14], which are poly-
nomials of degree 4. In our study, we will follow this fashion, and emphasize
on polynomial price functions τa(·) and others that are related to polynomi-
als, e.g., regularly varying functions [3]. However, the polynomials we will
consider are general, i.e., they are allowed to have different degrees. We do
not consider strategies that are completely free, i.e.,
∑
a∈A r(a, s) · τa(x) ≡ 0
for all x ≥ 0, for some group k ∈ K and some strategy s ∈ Sk. This is rather
reasonable in congestion game, since users with choices of free strategies are
actually outside the underlying game!
1.3 Selfish user behavior
NCGs are non-cooperative, and so users are considerd to be selfish. They
would like to use strategies minimizing their own cost. For instance, travelers
would like to follow a quickest path, so as to reduce their travel latency. In
general, the cost of a user is just the cost of the strategy adopted by that
user. Given a vector d = (dk)k∈K of user volumes and a feasible profile f,
the cost of a strategy s ∈ S equals ∑a∈A r(a, s) · τa(fa), where fa denotes
the total consumed volume of resource a w.r.t. profile f , for each a ∈ A.
Obviously, for road traffic, the cost of a strategy s ∈ S is just the total travel
time (latency) along path s.
The selfish behavior of users will eventually lead the underlying game
into a so-called Wardrop equalibrium (WE) [27], in which every user follows
a cheapest strategy he could follow given the choices of all other users, see
Section 2 for details. Under our assumption of continuous and non-decreasing
price functions τa(·), a WE is actually a pure Nash equilibrium (NE) [18],
in which all users will loyally adhere to the choices they have done, since
no unilateral change in strategy can introduce any extra profit. Therefore,
the game will enter a steady state if no external force interferes. An NE
(equivalently, a WE) is thus a macro model of user (selfish) behavior. The
average cost of users in an NE profile therefore reflects the cost users need to
pay in practice. Note that under our setting of continuous and non-decreasing
price functions τa(·), all NE profiles will have the same cost, see, e.g., [26].
A question of great interest in NCGs is whether user (selfish) behavior
is harmful. This actually concerns whether the selfish behavior of users will
demage social welfare, i.e., increases the average cost of users engaged in the
game. If this is the case, then we may need to employ some external forces
or measures to break up the equilibrium induced by the selfish behavior, so
as to get closer to social welfare. For road traffic, possible external measures
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could be some road guidance policies like congestion pricing, see, e.g., [4],
[11], [5], [17] and [12].
The price of anarchy (PoA), a concept stemming from [16], is a popular
measure for the “defficiency” of selfish user behavior. Given a vector d =
(dk)k∈K of user volumes, a feasible strategy profile f ∗ is said to be at system
optimum (SO) if it minimizes the average cost of users engaged in the game.
The value of the PoA for non-decreasing price functions τa(·) equals the
ratio of the average cost of users in an NE profile over that in an SO profile.
Obviously, the larger the value of PoA, the more selfish user behavior demages
the social welfare.
The value of the PoA does not only reflect the extent to which the selfish
user behavior ruins social welfare, but also the potential benifit we could
get if all users were appropriately guided. For road traffic, the value of the
PoA thus shows the extent to which the average latency can be reduced in
principle, if all travelers use the “right” paths. Therefore, for our purpose,
we need a close inspection of the value of the PoA.
1.4 The state of the art
Traditionally, selfish user behavior is considered to be harmful, see, e.g.,
the studies in [19], [20], [21], [24], [22], [9], [25], and [23]. These studies
investigated an upper bound of the PoA for several classes of price functions.
They demonstrated that the worst-case upper bound can be very large. A
famous example motivating these studies is Pigou’s game, see, e.g., [13] or
Figure 1. In Pigou’s game, there is only one user group with two strategies
o t
1
xβ
Figure 1: Pigou’s game
of price functions xβ and 1, respectively, for some constant β ≥ 0. The PoA
of this game equals T/
(
T − (β + 1)−1/β + (β + 1)−1), where T ≥ 1 is the
volume of users engaged in the game. Obviously, considering all possible β,
5
the worst-case upper bound of the PoA is infinity, since the PoA tends to ∞
as β →∞, if T = 1.
Worst-case upper bounds of the PoA are actually not a valid evidence
to show that selfish user behavior is bad, especially not for a large total
volume of users. For instance, the PoA of Pigou’s game actually tends to
1, as T approaches infinity, for each fixed β ≥ 0. This means that selfish
user behavior may well guarantee social welfare if the total user volume is
large. Generally, the total travel demand in rush hours is usually very large.
Therefore, to comprehensively understand selfish (routing) behavior, a closer
inspection of the value of the PoA is still needed, especially for the case of
heavy traffic, i.e., the case when the total travel demand T (d) =
∑
k∈K dk is
large.
Recently, several studies have been done in this direction, see [8], [6], [7],
and [28]. Colini et al. [8] considered two special cases: (i) games with a single
OD pair, and (ii) games with a single OD pair with parallel feasible paths. For
case (i), they proved that if one of the feasible paths has a latency function
that is bounded by a constant from above, then the PoA will converge to 1 as
the total demand T (d) tends to infinity. For case (ii), they proved that if the
latency functions τa(·) are regularly varying [3], then the PoA will converge
to 1 as the total demand T (d) tends to infinity.
Colini et al. [7] continued the study of [8]. They investigated more general
cases, i.e., games with multiple OD pairs. Using the notion of regular varia-
tion [3], they proposed the concept of gaugeable games that are defined only
for particular user volume vector sequences {d(n)}n∈N fulfilling the condition
that limn→∞
∑
k∈Ktight
d
(n)
k
T (d(n))
, see [7] or Subsection 3.1 for details. With
the technique of regular variation [3], they proved that the PoA of gaugeable
games converges to 1 as the total demand T (d) =
∑
k∈K dk tends to infinity.
However, this convergence result only holds for particular user volume vec-
tor sequences, due to the sequence-specific nature of gaugeable games. See
Subsection 3.1 for details about the convergence results of gaugeable games.
Colini et al. [6] further continued the study of [7]. They applied the tech-
nique of gaugeability [7] to NCGs with polynomial price functions. Due to
the sequence-specific nature of gaugeability [7], they assumed a user volume
vector sequence {d(n)}n∈N with limn→∞ d
(n)
k
T (d(n))
> 0 for each group k ∈ K. They
proved that if all τa(·) are polynomials, then limn→∞ PoA(d(n)) = 1, provided
that limn→∞ T (d(n)) = ∞. Moreover, Colini et al. [6] further extended the
study of [7] to light traffic, i.e., T (d)→ 0.
All the results of [8], [6] and [7] are derived with the technique of regular
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variation [3]. A different study was done by Wu et al. [28]. They assumed
arbitrary user volume vector sequence {d(n)}n∈N and aimed to explore prop-
erties of asymptotic well designed games, i.e., games in which the PoA tends
to 1, as the total volume T (d) approaches infinity. They proposed the con-
cept of scalable games, and proved that all scalable games are asymptotically
well designed. They also proved that gaugeable games are special cases of
scalable games w.r.t. the particular user volume vector sequences assumed
by gaugeability. Moreover, they provided examples that are scalable, but not
gaugeable.
In addition, Wu et al. [28] made a detailed study of the case that all τa(·)
are BPR-functions. They proved for this particular case that an SO profile
is an -approximate NE profile [19] for a small  > 0, and the PoA equals
1 + O
(
T (d)−γ
)
, where γ is the common degree of the BPR-functions. This
proves a conjecture proposed by O’Hare et al. [15]. They also proved for this
particular case that the cost of both, an NE-profile and an SO-profile, can
be asymptotically approximated by L(d) ·T (d)γ, where L(d) is a computable
constant that only depends on distribution d :=
(
dk/T (d)
)
k∈K of users among
groups, when the total volume T (d) is large enough. However, Wu et al. [28]
still failed to show that NCGs with general polynomials are asymptotically
well designed.
In summary, [8], [6], [7] and [28] definitely show that selfish behavior need
not be bad for the case of a large T (d) under certain conditions. However,
one important question has remained open, namely, whether NCGs with
arbitrary polynomial price functions τa(·) are asymptotically well designed.
Although [6] and [7] have preliminary results towards this question, their
results only partially answer this question due to the sequence-specific nature
of their study.
Polynomial functions are so popular because they usually serve as a first
prototype to understand quantitative relations between variables. Price func-
tions τa(·) are key components of an NCG and model the quantitative rela-
tions between resource prices and demanded volumes. NCGs with polynomial
price functions τa(·) are thus of great importance in practice. The open ques-
tion about the PoA for polynomials thus concerns properties of the selfish
user behavior in such games for a large user volume T (d) and is thus of great
interest to our purpose of understanding heavy traffic.
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1.5 Our main result
We will continue the study of [28]. However, to better understand the state
of the art, we will first discuss the notions of scalability [28] and gaugeability
[7], and give a detailed description of the known results from [28], [6] and [7],
see Subsection 3.1.
We then apply the concepts of scalability and limit games stemming from
[28]. We first prove that if the limit game exists, then an NCG is asymp-
totically well designed if and only if it is scalable, see Theorem 1. This
deepens the knowledge about scalability and asymptotically well designed
games. For an even deeper understanding, we adapt some algebraic ideas to
our analysis and consider decompositions of NCGs. We prove that the class
of asymptotically well designed games is actually closed under direct sums,
see Corollary 2. This demonstrates in a certain sense the extent of the notion
of asymptotically designed games.
To obtain a general proof for the convergence of the PoA, we develop a
new technique called asymptotic decomposition. This technique generalizes
the idea of direct sums, and is designed for handling general NCGs in the
limit analysis. We are able to demonstrate its power by applying it to NCGs
with arbitrary polynomial price functions and NCGs with regularly varying
price functions, see Theorem 2, Theorem 3 and Theorem 4.
With the asymptotic decomposition, we are able to prove that NCGs
with arbitrary polynomial price functions are asymptotically well designed,
see Theorem 2. This completely solves the convergence of the PoA of NCGs
with polynomial price functions, and thus the aforementioned open question.
This result greatly extends the findings of [28], [8], [7] and [6] for road traffic,
and deepens the understanding that selfishness need not be bad, and might
be the best choice in a bad environment. Moreover, this result also indicates
that selfish routing is actually not the main cause of congestion, when the
total travel demand T (d) is large. In particular, if the total travel demand
stays high, then we cannot significantly reduce the average travel latency by
any road guidance policies.
Theorem 2 also brings some insight into free market economics. In market
economics, resources correspond to factors of production, groups correspond
to sets of suppliers manufacturing a particular type of product, and resource
prices τa(·) are the purchasing prices of those production factors. In a free
market system, the prices τa(·) of production factors are completely deter-
mined by the demanded volumes, and are often assumed to be polynomial
functions. Theorem 2 then shows that given the demand of each product
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type, the free market will autonomously minimize the average manufactur-
ing cost, when the total number of suppliers is large.
Asymptotic decomposition also applies to NCGs with price functions of
other types. To demonstrate this, we also applied this technique to NCGs
with regularly varying price functions. The result shows that these NCGs are
in general also asymptotically well designed, see Theorem 3. In particular,
with this technique, we are able to remove the sequence limitation for gauge-
able games and generalize the main result Theorem 4.4 in [7] for gaugeability,
see Theorem 4.
Theorem 2, Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 definitely demonstrate the power
of asymptotic decomposition. They assume an arbitrary user volume vector
sequence, and thus the results hold globally. In particular, together they
constitute a general proof that selfishness need not be bad for NCGs. Their
proofs are direct and very elementary without using any heavy machinery,
and only use some basic properties of Nash equilibrium and system optimum
profiles, simple facts about asymptotic notation O(·),Ω(·), etc, and a simple
induction over the group set K.
1.6 The structure of the paper
The remainder of the article is arranged as follows: Section 2 gives a detailed
description of the NCG model that we will study. Section 3 gives a detailed
description on known results and then reports our results. Section 4 gives
a brief summary of the whole article. To improve readability, we move the
elementary but long proofs of our results to the Appendix.
2 The Model
In our study, we follow the formulation of NCGs in [28]. This formulation is
slightly different from the traditional model commonly used in the literature,
see, e.g., [13]. Traditionally, a strategy is assumed to be a subset of resources.
In our study, we employ a constant r(a, s) ≥ 0 to refelct the relation between
a resource a ∈ A and a strategy s ∈ S. This slightly generalizes our results.
An NCG is represented by a tuple
Γ =
(K, A,S, (r(a, s))a∈A,s∈S , (τa)a∈A, d),
where:
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• K is a finite non-empty set of groups. We assume, w.l.o.g., that K =
{1, . . . , K}, i.e., there are K groups of users.
• A is a finite non-empty set of resources that will be demanded by users
engaged in the game.
• S = ⋃k∈K Sk is a finite non-empty set of available strategies. Herein,
each Sk contains all strategies available to users in group k for each
k ∈ K. We assume that Sk ∩ Sk′ = ∅, provided that k 6= k′, for each
k, k′ ∈ K.
• r(a, s) ≥ 0 denotes the demanded volume of resource a by a user adopt-
ing strategy s, for each a ∈ A and each s ∈ S.
• τa : [0,+∞) 7→ [0,+∞) denotes the price function of resource a for
each a ∈ A. We assume that each τa(x) is a continuous function that
is non-negative and non-decreasing for all x ≥ 0, for all a ∈ A.
• d = (dk)k∈K is a non-negative user volume vector, where each compo-
nent dk ≥ 0 represents the volume of users belonging to group k ∈ K.
In our study, we assume further that for each group k ∈ K and each strategy
s ∈ Sk, ∑
a∈Sk
r(a, s) · τa(x) 6≡ 0. (1)
Note that (1) is a reasonable assumption. Otherwise, there would be a group
k ∈ K, whose users can consume resources without paying any price. This
actually conflicts with the spirit of congestion games in practice.
In an NCG, users usually want to adopt strategies that minimize their
own cost. However, the cost of a user does not only depend on his/her choice,
but also on the choices of other users, i.e., the cost of a user is eventually
determined by the strategy profile formed by all users engaged in the game.
Herein, a feasible strategy profile f can be represented by a vector f = (fs)s∈S ,
where:
p1) Each component fs ≥ 0 represents the total volume of users adopting
strategy s, for each strategy s ∈ S.
p2)
∑
s∈Sk fs = dk, for each group k ∈ K, which indicates that every user
must choose a strategy to follow.
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Consider a feasible strategy profile f = (fs)s∈S . The demanded volume
(or consumed volume) of each resource a ∈ A w.r.t profile f, denoted by fa,
can be computed as
fa =
∑
s∈S
r(a, s) · fs.
Thus, the price of a resource a ∈ A w.r.t. profile f equals τa(fa). Therefore,
the cost of a strategy s ∈ S w.r.t. profile f, denoted by τs(f), equals
τs(f) =
∑
a∈A
r(a, s) · τa(fa).
Then, the average cost of users w.r.t. profile f equals
C(f) :=
1
T (d)
·
∑
s∈S
fs · τs(f) = 1
T (d)
·
∑
a∈A
fa · τa(fa),
where T (d) =
∑
k∈K dk denotes the total volume of users in the game.
The selfishness of users will autonomously lead their choices to eventually
form a feasible profile f˜ =
(
f˜s
)
s∈S satisfying that
∀k ∈ K ∀s, s′ ∈ Sk
(
f˜s > 0 =⇒ τs(f) ≤ τs′(f˜)
)
, (2)
i.e., every user chooses a “cheapest” strategy he/she could follow w.r.t. pro-
file f˜ . Such profiles are called Wardrop equilibria (WE, [27]). Under our
assumption on the price functions τa(·), Wardrop equilibria coincide with
the pure Nash equilibria (NE). A feasible strategy profile f = (fs)s∈S is said
to be at NE, if
∀k ∈ K ∀s, s′ ∈ Sk
(
fs > 0 =⇒
(
∀(fs >  > 0) =⇒ τs(f) ≤ τs′(f 1+)
))
,
(3)
where f 1+ = (f 1+s′′ )s′′∈S is a feasible strategy profile that moves  users from
strategy s to strategy s′, i.e., for each strategy s′′ ∈ S,
f 1+s′′ =

fs′′ if s
′′ /∈ {s, s′},
fs′′ −  if s′′ = s,
fs′′ +  if s
′′ = s′.
In the sequel, we shall always put a tilde above a strategy profile, if the
strategy profile is an NE profile (or, equivalently a Wardrop equilibrium).
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An NE profile f˜ is a macro model for the selfish behavior of users in
practice. Under our assumption on price functions τa(·), all NE profiles f˜
have the same average cost, see e.g. [26] for a proof. Obviously, these profiles
are user “optimal” (2), and stable (3) to some extent.
Besides NE profiles, system optimum (SO) profiles are also of great in-
terest, for the sake of achieving social welfare. Formally, a feasible strategy
profile f ∗ = (f ∗s )s∈S is an SO profile if it solves the following program:
min C(f)
s.t.∑
s∈Sk
fs = dk,∀k ∈ K,
fs ≥ 0,∀s ∈ S.
(4)
In the sequel, we shall always use a star in the superscript of a feasible profile
to indicate that it is an SO profile.
In general, an NE profile need not be a solution to the program (4). The
PoA is a popular index to show the extent to which the selfish user behavior
destroys social welfare in practice. It is a concept stemming from [16], and
can be defined as follows
PoA :=
C(f˜)
C(f ∗)
=
∑
s∈S f˜s · τs(f˜)∑
s∈S f
∗
s · τs(f ∗)
, (5)
where f˜ is an NE profile, and f ∗ is an SO profile.
As mentioned, we will investigate the limit of the PoA when the total
volume T (d) =
∑
k∈K dk approaches infinity. Therefore, to avoid ambiguity,
we shall denote by PoA(d) the corresponding PoA for user volume vector
d = (dk)k∈K in the sequel.
3 Selfishness need not be bad: a general dis-
cussion
In this Section, we consider the limit of the PoA under our assumption of
continuous, non-decreasing and non-negative price functions τa(·). In partic-
ular, we will emphasize on the polynomial functions and regularly varying
functions that have been recently studied in [28], [8], [6] and [7]. To better
understand our result, we first introduce some relevant concepts and results
from [28] and [7].
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3.1 Scalability and gaugeability
NCGs are static models for decision-making behavior of selfish users (players)
in systems with limited resources. Designing an NCG such that the selfish
choices of users autonomously optimize social welfare is in general not easy,
see e.g. [20]. However, such games exist, see [28].
Definition 1 (See [28]). An NCG Γ is said to be a well designed game
(WDG), if PoA(d) = 1 for each given user volume vector d = (dk)k∈K with
total user volume T (d) > 0.
Obviously, selfish behavior of users in a WDG should be strongly favored,
as it leads the underlying system into a steady state with minimum average
cost. Readers may refer to [28] for examples of WDGs.
As mentioned, WDGs are often too restrictive for designing them in prac-
tice. Nevertheless, an important goal in NCGs concerns how to effectively
allocate limited resources to a large volume of users. Therefore, an alterna-
tive choice to designing a WDG is to design an NCG that will approximate
a WDG when the total user volume T (d) becomes large. This inspires the
concept of an asymptotically well designed game (AWDG) [28].
Definition 2 (see [28]). An NCG Γ is said to be an AWDG, if the PoA(d)
converges to 1 as T (d) approaches infinity. For later use, we also denote the
class of all AWDGs as AWDG.
Scalable games introduced by Wu et al. [28] are examples of AWDGs.
These games require the existence of a well designed limit game for each
sequence {d(n)}n∈N of user volume vectors with
lim
n→∞
T (d(n)) =
∑
k∈K
d
(n)
k =∞,
where d
(n)
k is the k-th component of d
(n) =
(
d
(n)
k
)
k∈K and denote the user
volume in group k for each k ∈ K and each n ∈ N.
Definition 3. Given a sequence
{
d(n) = (d
(n)
k )k∈K
}
n∈N of user volume vectors
with limn→∞ T (d(n)) = limn→∞
∑
k∈K d
(n)
k =∞, an NCG
Γ∞ =
(K∞, A,S∞, (r(a, s))a∈A,s∈S∞ , (τ∞a )a∈A,d)
is called a limit of the NCG
Γ =
(
K, A,S, (r(a, s))a∈A,s∈S , (τa)a∈A, d
)
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w.r.t. the user volume vector sequence {d(n)}n∈N, if there exists an infinite
subsequence {ni}i∈N such that:
L1) For each k ∈ K,
lim
i→∞
d
(ni)
k
T (d(ni))
= dk,
where dk ∈ [0, 1] is the limit volume of group k.
L2) There exists a sequence {gi}i∈N of positive scaling factors, such that
lim
i→∞
τa
(
T (d(ni))x
)
gi
= τ∞a (x)
for all x > 0, where τ∞a (·) is the limit price of resource a, for each
a ∈ A.
L3) Each limit price function τ∞a (·) is either a continuous and non-decreasing
function, or τ∞a (x) ≡ ∞ for all x > 0, for each a ∈ A. And for each
group k ∈ K,
L3.1) either group k is negligible w.r.t. scaling factors {gi}i∈N, i.e.,
lim
i→∞
∑
s∈Sk f
(ni)
s · τs(f (ni))
T (d(ni)) · gi = 0,
where each f (ni) is an arbitrary feasible strategy profile of Γ w.r.t.
user volume vector d(ni) for each i ∈ N,
L3.2) or there exists a strategy s ∈ Sk that is tight w.r.t. scaling factors
{gi}i∈N, i.e., τ∞a (x) 6≡ ∞ for x > 0, for each resource a ∈ A with
r(a, s) > 0.
L4) Put
S∞ :=
{
s ∈ S : s is tight w.r.t. {gi}i∈N
}
,
K∞ := {k ∈ K : k is not negligible, or Sk ∩ S∞ 6= ∅}.
The cost of NE profiles of the limit game Γ∞ is positive w.r.t. the limit
user volume vector (dk)k∈K∞ .
Definition 4 (See also [28]). An NCG Γ is called a scalable game if, for each
user volume sequence {d(n)}n∈N with total volume T (d(n)) → ∞ as n → ∞,
there is a well designed game Γ∞ that is a limit of Γ w.r.t. the user volume
sequence {d(n)}n∈N.
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Conditions L3) and L4) of Definition 3 are imposed to guarantee that the
cost of NE profiles in the limit game Γ∞ will be neither unbounded, nor van-
ishing w.r.t. the scaling factors {gi}i∈N. Therefore, the scaling factors {gi}i∈N
should be carefully chosen with reference to the sequence {T (d(n))}n∈N of user
volume vectors and price functions τa(·), so as to fulfill these conditions.
Note that limit games only consider tight strategies s ∈ S∞ and “non-
negligible” groups k ∈ K∞. This is actually reasonable, since users will
asymptotically adopt only tight strategies w.r.t. both, NE profiles and SO
profiles, see the proofs of Lemma 1 and Theorem 1 in the Appendix.
Condition L2) of Definition 3 can be further relaxed. Note that for each
resource a ∈ A, only those x > 0 make sense that are possible consumed
volumes of resource a w.r.t. the limit Γ∞. We can therefore require only
that the limit price functions τ∞a (x) exist for x ∈ Ia ∩ (0,∞), where Ia is
a non-empty set containing all the possible consumed volumes of resource a
w.r.t. the limit game Γ∞, for each a ∈ A. See [28] for details.
Note that it is possible that there are several limit games for a given user
volume sequence {d(n)}n∈N, see the following example.
O1
O2 t 2
t 1
2 x+1
3 x+1
4 x2+1
5 x2+1
Figure 2: An NCG with double limits
Example 1. Consider the NCG Γ shown in Figure 2. The game has two
groups (OD pairs), each of which has two strategies (two parallel paths).
The price functions are listed above the corresponding paths. Let {d(n) =
(d
(n)
1 , d
(n)
2 )}n∈N be a user volume vector sequence such that
d
(n)
1 =
{
0 if n is odd,
n if n is even,
d
(n)
2 =
{
n if n is odd,
0 if n is even,
where d
(n)
1 denotes user volume of the upper group, and d
(n)
2 denotes user
volume of the lower group, for each n ∈ N. Obviously, w.r.t. subsequence
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{2i}i∈N and scaling factor sequence {gi = i}i∈N, the lower group is negligible
since d
(2i)
2 ≡ 0 for all i ∈ N. Moreover, limit price functions
lim
i→∞
2 · (2i · x) + 1
2i
= 2x and lim
i→∞
3 · (2i · x) + 1
2i
= 3x
exist and are continuous and non-decreasing for all x > 0.
Furthermore, the NCG game Γ∞1 consisting of these two limit price func-
tions and the upper group has positive average cost for NE profiles w.r.t. the
limit user volume vector (d1), where d1 = 1. Thus, Γ
∞
1 is a limit game of Γ
w.r.t. the given user volume vector sequence {d(n)}n∈N.
Similarly, considering the subsequence {2i + 1}i∈N and scaling factor se-
quence {gi = (2i + 1)2}i∈N, we can define another limit game Γ∞2 consisting
of the lower group and two price functions 4x, 5x, respectively.
Obviously, these two limit games Γ∞1 and Γ
∞
2 are different. However,
both of them are limits of the given NCG Γ w.r.t. the user volume sequence
{d(n)}n∈N.
Wu et al. [28] proved that for an NCG Γ and a given user volume vector
{d(n)}n∈N with total volume T (d(n)) → ∞ as n → ∞, if Γ∞ is the limit of
Γ for an infinite subsequence {ni}i∈N and a scaling factor sequence {gi}i∈N,
then the average cost of NE profiles normalized by the scaling factor sequence
{gi}i∈N converges to the total cost of NE profiles of Γ∞.
Lemma 1. Consider an NCG
Γ =
(
K, A,S, (r(a, s))a∈A,s∈S , (τa)a∈A, d
)
,
in which all price functions τa(·) are non-negative, non-decreasing and con-
tinuous. Let {d(n)}n∈N be an arbitrary sequence of user volume vectors such
that the total volume T (d(n)) =
∑
k∈K d
(n)
k → ∞ as n → ∞, where each
d(n) = (d
(n)
k )k∈K for each n ∈ N. Let f˜ (n) =
(
f
(n)
s
)
s∈S be an NE profile of Γ
for the user volume vector d(n), for each n ∈ N. If Γ has a limit
Γ∞ =
(K∞, A,S∞, (r(a, s))a∈A,s∈S∞ , (τ∞a )a∈A,d)
for the user volume vector sequence {d(n)}n∈N, then there exists an infinite
subsequence {ni}i∈N and a sequence {gi}i∈N of positive numbers such that
lim
i→∞
C(f˜ (ni))
gi
=
∑
s∈S∞
f˜
∞
s · τ∞s (f˜
∞
),
where f˜
∞
= (f˜ s)s∈S∞ is some NE profile of the limit game Γ
∞.
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Proof. See the proof of Theorem 3.2 in [28], or the appendix for an alternative
proof.
Using Lemma 1, Wu et al. [28] then proved that all scalable games are
asymptotically well designed. In that proof, the condition that the limit
game is well designed plays a pivotal role, which actually implies that the
average costs of NE profiles is asymptotically not larger than the average
costs of SO profiles. We summarize this in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. Every scalable game is an AWDG.
Proof. See the proof of Theorem 3.2 in [28] for details.
Theorem 1 below continues the study of Wu et al. [28]. It states that
scalable games and AWDGs actually coincide when they have a limit game.
Moreover, we showed in the proof of Theorem 1 that users will asymptotically
adopt only tight strategies w.r.t. SO profiles, and Lemma 1 also applies to
SO profiles. Therefore, it is reasonable to consider only tight strategies in
limit games.
Theorem 1. Consider an NCG Γ and a user volume vector {d(n)}n∈N with
the total volume T (d(n)) → ∞ as n → ∞. If Γ has a limit game Γ∞ w.r.t.
the given user volume vector, and the limit game Γ∞ is not well designed,
then Γ is not an AWDG.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Specific for polynomial price functions, Theorem 3.2 from Wu et al. [28]
directly yields that NCGs with polynomial price functions τa(·) of the same
degree are asymptotically well designed. In that case, we can take scaling
factors gn = T (d
(n))γ for each given user volume vector sequence {d(n)}n∈N
with T (d(n)) → ∞ as n → ∞, where γ ≥ 0 is the common degree of all
polynomials. Then, the corresponding limit game is well designed.
To show this for general polynomial price functions τa(·) with different
degrees, we will use some helpful notations from [6]. For each resource a ∈ A,
let ρa(·) be the degree of polynomial τa(·). Put ρs = max{ρa : r(a, s) > 0, a ∈
A} and ρk = min{ρs : s ∈ Sk} for each s ∈ Sk and k ∈ K. If ρk = ρl for
all k, l ∈ K, then the above argument shows that the underlying NCG is
scalable, and therefore asymptotically well designed. We summarize this in
Corollary 1.
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Corollary 1. Consider an NCG Γ with polynomial price functions τa(·). If
ρk = ρl for all k, l ∈ K, then Γ is asymptotically well designed.
Proof. Let {d(n)}n∈N be an arbitrary user volume vector such that T (d(n))→
∞ as n → ∞. Let ρ = ρk for some k ∈ K. Put gn = T (d(n))ρ for each
n ∈ N. By assumption (1), one can then easily show that the limit of Γ w.r.t.
sequence {n}n∈N and the scaling factor sequence {gn}n∈N is well designed.
The result of Wu et al. [28] does not directly apply if ρk 6= ρl for some
l, k ∈ K. The reason is that, in this case, there need not exist a unified limit
game for all groups for some user volume vector sequences {d(n)}n∈N. We
thus need additional arguments in this case and leave the proof of this case
to Subsection 3.3.
To better understand the current state of the art, we now introduce some
relevant results from [6] and [7]. They employed an alternative technical
path to prove the convergence of the PoA. They introduced the so-called
gaugeable games, which consider only particular sequences of user volume
vectors. Gaugeability is a concept based on the notion of regular variation
[3]. A non-negative function g(·) is said to be regularly varying, if the limit
lim
t→∞
g(t · x)
g(t)
= q(x) ∈ (0,∞) (6)
exists for all x > 0.
Definition 5 (See also [7]). An NCG Γ is said to be gaugeable for a user
volume vector {d(n)}, if there exists a regularly varying function g(·) such
that:
G1) The limit
lim
n→∞
τa(x)
g(x)
=: qa ∈ [0,∞]
exists for all resource a ∈ A.
G2) For each group k ∈ K, there exists a strategy s ∈ Sk such that
qa <∞, for all resource a ∈ A with r(a, s) > 0.
G3) The lower limit
lim
n→∞
∑
k∈Ktight
d
(n)
k
T (d(n))
> 0, (7)
18
where Ktight is the set of all tight groups, and a group k is said to be
tight in such a case if
0 < min
s∈Sk
max{qa : r(a, s) > 0, a ∈ A} <∞.
With the technique of regular variation [3], Colini et al. [7] proved that
for each NCG Γ, if Γ is gaugeable w.r.t. a user volume vector {d(n)}n∈N,
then PoA(d(n))→ 1 as n→∞, see Theorem 4.4 in [7]. Here, we recall that
PoA(d(n)) denotes the price of anarchy w.r.t. user volume vector d(n), for
each n ∈ N.
In fact, if Γ is gaugeable w.r.t. a user volume vector {d(n)}n∈N, then Γ
has a well designed limit w.r.t. that user volume vector sequence. Let g(·)
be the required regularly varying function in Definition 5. By G1), the limit
price functions
τ∞a
(
x
)
= lim
n→∞
τa
(
T (d(n))x
)
gn
= qa · xρ
exist, where the scaling factors gn = g
(
T (d(n))
)
, and ρ ≥ 0 is the regular
variation index of g in Karamata’s Characterization Theorem [3]. Moreover,
by G2) and G3), one can easily check that the limit game consisting of
groups K∞ = K and price functions τ∞a is well designed. See Wu et al. [28]
for details. Therefore, gaugeable games are special cases of scalable games.
To explicitly show this, we define the “sequential counterpart” of scalable
games in a natural way.
Definition 6. Consider an NCG Γ and some user volume vector {d(n)}n∈N
with T (d(n)) → ∞ as n → ∞. Γ is said to be scalable w.r.t. the sequence
{d(n)}n∈N, if for each infinite subsequence {ni}i∈N, Γ has a well designed limit
w.r.t. the subsequence {d(ni)}i∈N.
Obviously, an NCG Γ is scalable if and only if Γ is scalable w.r.t. each
user volume sequence {d(n)}n∈N with limn→∞ T (d(n)) = ∞. However, if Γ is
only scalable w.r.t. some user volume sequence {d(n)}n∈N, then Γ need not to
be globally scalable. Nevertheless, Lemma 3 below states that this restricted
notion of scalability already generalizes the gaugeability of [7].
Lemma 3. Consider an NCG Γ and some user volume vector {d(n)}n∈N with
T (d(n))→∞ as n→∞. If Γ is gaugeable w.r.t. the sequence {d(n)}n∈N, then
Γ is also scalable w.r.t. that user volume vector sequence.
Proof. See the proof of Corollary 3.1 in Wu et al. [28] for details.
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The difference between scalable games and gaugeable games are there-
fore obvious. Scalable games consider arbitrary user volume vector sequence,
while gaugeable games consider particular user volume vector sequence sat-
isfying (7). Thus, the convergence result of the PoA for scalable games is
global, while that for gaugeable games holds only locally.
Actually, scalablity is more general than gaugeability even for a specific
user volume vector sequence {d(n)}n∈N. Gaugeability requires that there ex-
ists a uniform regularly varying function g(·) for the whole sequence that
fulfills conditions G1)-G3). As shown above, this results in the same well
designed limit game for every subsequence of {d(n)}n∈N. However, scalabil-
ity allows different subsequences of {d(n)}n∈N to have different well designed
limit games. The NCG Γ in Example 1 has two limit games w.r.t. the given
user volume vector sequence, and both of them are well designed, see Wu et
al. [28] for details. We summarize this in Lemma 4.
Lemma 4. There exists an NCG Γ and a user volume vector sequence
{d(n)}n∈N with T (d(n)) → ∞ as n → ∞, such that Γ is scalable w.r.t.
{d(n)}n∈N, but not gaugeable w.r.t. {d(n)}n∈N.
Proof. See the proof of Theorem 3.4 in Wu et al. [28], or Example 1.
Now, let us return to the discussion of NCGs with arbitrary polynomial
price functions τa(·). By considering a particular user volume vector sequence
{d(n)}n∈N, Colini et al. [6] proved that PoA(d(n)) → 1, as n → ∞, see also
Corollary 4.7 in [7]. They assumed that for each k ∈ K,
lim
n→∞
d
(n)
k
T (d(n))
> 0. (8)
Obviously, (8) fulfills (7). Let g(x) = T (d(n))ρ, where ρ = max{ρk : k ∈
K}. They actually proved that if {d(n)}n∈N satisfies (8), then the underlying
NCG is gaugeable w.r.t. {d(n)}n∈N and regularly varying function g(·). We
summarize this in Lemma 5.
Lemma 5. Consider an NCG Γ with polynomial price functions τa(·), and
a user volume vector sequence {d(n)}n∈N such that T (d(n)) → ∞ as n → ∞,
and satisfies (8). Then, Γ is scalable w.r.t. {d(n)}n∈N, i.e., PoA(d(n)) → 1
as n→∞.
Proof. The proof follows immediately from Lemma 3.
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Although Lemma 5 shows an inspiring result for general polynomial price
functions, we can not directly conclude that NCGs with polynomial price
functions are asymptotically well designed, due to the sequence-specific na-
ture of Lemma 5. To show that NCGs with polynomial price functions are
asymptotically well designed, we still need a more sophisticated analysis.
Motivated by Lemma 3, Lemma 4, and Example 1, we will use the idea of
scalability for a general proof.
3.2 AWDG is closed under direct sum
A direct application of scalability does not lead to a general proof. To see
this, consider again Example 1, but now with user volume vector sequence
d(n) = (d
(n)
1 = n
2, d
(n)
2 = n). In this case, the two groups are mutually non-
negligible, and we cannot find a suitable scaling factor sequence that results
in a well designed limit game. However, a closer inspection shows that either
of the two groups has its own well designed limit game w.r.t. the given user
volume sequence. This inspires us to consider the two groups separately.
Definition 7. An NCG Γ is said to have mutually disjoint groups (MDGs),
if ∑
k∈K
1{x:x>0}
(
r(a, sk)
) ≤ 1, (9)
for each a ∈ A, for each K-dimensional strategy vector (s1, . . . , sK) ∈
∏
k∈K Sk,
where 1{x:x>0}(·) is the indicator function of set {x : x > 0}.
Condition (9) in Definition 7 implies that users from different groups can-
not share resources. Therefore, users from different groups of an NCG with
MDGs will not affect each other when they determine strategies to follow.
This means that each group in an NCG with MDGs forms an independent
subgame. Let
Γ =
(
K, A,S, (r(a, s))a∈A,s∈S , (τa)a∈A, d
)
be an NCG with MDGs. For each group k ∈ K, we denote by
Γ|k =
(
{k}, A,S, (r(a, s))a∈A,s∈Sk , (τa)a∈A, (dk)
)
the k-marginal of Γ, and denote by f|k = (fs)s∈Sk the k-marginal of a feasible
strategy f = (fs)s∈S .
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Lemma 6. Consider an NCG Γ with MDGs. Then, f ∗ = (f ∗s )s∈S is an SO
profile of Γ if and only if the k-th marginal profile f ∗|k =
(
f ∗s
)
s∈Sk is an SO
profile of the k-marginal game Γ|k, for each k ∈ K. This holds similarly for
NE profiles.
Proof. Trivial.
With Lemma 6 and by applying scalability to each of the mutually inde-
pendent marginals, we can easily derive that NCGs with mutually disjoint
and scalable marginals are asymptotically well designed.
Lemma 7. Consider an NCG Γ with MDGs. If all the marginals are scalable,
then Γ is asymptotically well designed.
Proof. This is easy by observing the trivial facts that
PoA(d) =
C(f˜)
C(f ∗)
=
∑
k∈K
∑
s∈Sk f˜s · τs(f˜)∑
k∈K
∑
s∈Sk f
∗
s · τs(f ∗)
,
and that each marginal is scalable, and thus the marginal PoA∑
s∈Sk f˜s · τs(f˜)∑
k∈Sk f
∗
s · τs(f ∗)
,
tends to 1, as dk →∞, for each k ∈ K. Herein we recall assumption (1) that
there are no free strategies, and that
τs(f˜) = τs(f˜|k) and τs(f ∗) = τs(f ∗|k),
if s ∈ Sk, for each k ∈ K.
Combining Corollary 1 and Lemma 7, we obtain immediately that NCGs
with MDGs and polynomial price functions τa(·) are asymptoticall well de-
signed.
A direct extension of Lemma 7 considers the direct sum of asymptotically
well designed games. Let
Γl =
(
Kl, Al,Sl, (r(a, s))a∈Al,s∈Sl , (τa)a∈Al , d(l)
)
be an NCG, for l = 1, . . . ,m, such that A1, . . . , Am are mutually disjoint.
Then, we call the game( m⋃
l=1
Kl,
m⋃
l=1
Al,
m⋃
l=1
Sl, (r(a, s))a∈⋃ml=1 Al,s∈⋃ml=1 Sl , (τa)a∈⋃ml=1 Al ,
m⋃
l=1
d(l)
)
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the direct sum of Γ1, . . . ,Γm, denoted by ⊕ml=1Γl, where
⋃m
l=1 d(l) means the
concatenation of vectors d(1), . . . , d(m). Obviously, direct sums of asymptot-
ically well designed games are again asymptotically well designed.
Corollary 2. The class AWDG is closed under direct sums.
Proof. Trivial.
Corollary 2 suggests a possible approach to check whether an NCG is
aysmptotically well designed. One can try to decompose the underlying
NCG into a direct sum of several independent marginals, and then check the
scalability of each marginal. Here, we allow compound marginals, i.e., each
marginal can contain more than one group. The independence between them
then means that users from different marginals do not affect each other when
they determine strategies to follow.
However, in general, it could be difficult to find such a decomposition,
since different groups might compete for the same resources. The above
discussion has already shown that if collisions are heavy or slight, then it is
easy to check whether the underlying NCG is asymptotically well designed.
In fact, if all groups heavily collide on resources, i.e., every resource can be
used by all groups, then the game is not decomposable and Lemma 2 applies,
see e.g. Corollary 1. On the other hand, if groups do not collide on resources,
i.e., if they can be partitioned into several mutually disjoint classes w.r.t. the
use of resources, then the game is decomposable and Corollary 2 may apply.
The above two cases are, somehow, regular. Below, we consider the case
of irregular collisions, which might be the general case in practice.
3.3 Asymptotic decomposition: a general proof for poly-
nomial price functions
In general, it may be difficult to directly apply the idea of scalability, since
there need not exist a unified well designed game for all groups for some
user volume vector sequence. Moreover, it may also be difficult to directly
decompose the game, due to irregular collisions of groups on resources. If
this is the case, then one may consider an asymptotic decomposition. The
idea is similar to direct sums. However, one needs to additionally deal with
the problems caused by the irregular collisions.
An asymptotic decomposition is based on a suitable partition of the group
set K. Consider an arbitrary sequence {d(n)}n∈N of user volume vectors such
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that T (d(n))→∞ as n→∞. The decomposition aims to eventually partition
K into K0, . . . ,Kt, for some integer t ≥ 0, such that K =
⋃t
m=0Km, and
lim
n→∞
∑
k∈⋃mu=0Ku
∑
s∈Sk f˜
(n)
s · τs(f˜ (n))∑
k∈⋃mu=0Ku
∑
s∈Sk f
∗(n)
s · τs(f ∗(n))
= 1, (10)
for each m = 0, . . . , t, where f ∗(n), f˜ (n) are SO and NE profiles w.r.t. d(n),
respectively, for each n ∈ N. Obviously, if such partition can indeed be
constructed, then the underlying NCG is well designed, due to the arbitrary
choice of {d(n)}n∈N.
One can try to construct the partition inductively. In the beginning of
each inductive step l = 0, . . . , t, we assume that we have already constructed
classes K0, . . . ,Kl−1, such that K0 ⊆ K, . . . ,Kl−1 ⊆ K, and (10) holds for
step m = l − 1, where we employ the convention that K−1 = ∅, 00 = 1,
and “K0,K−1” means “∅”. The objective of step l then is to constuct class
Kl ⊆ K\
⋃l−1
u=0Ku such that (10) holds again for m = l.
To construct Kl, one can inspect the remaining groups more closely, and
pick those groups k ∈ K\⋃l−1u=0Ku that have a non-vanishing limit proportion
in the remaining total user volume Tl(d
(n)) := T (d(n))−∑k∈⋃l−1u=0 Sk d(n)k , since
these groups are most significant in the limit. To show (10) for m = l, one
needs to argue that these groups are either asymptotically independent of the
groups that have been considered before, or negligible compared to them.
To that end, one needs to suitably estimate the costs of users w.r.t. NE
profiles f˜ (n) and SO profiles f ∗(n), respectively. By comparing the cost of
users from groups k ∈ Kl with those from groups k′ ∈
⋃l−1
u=0Ku, one can then
learn whether groups k ∈ Kl are negligible. If they are negligible, then (10)
holds trivially for m = l. Otherwise, groups k ∈ Kl will be asymptotically
independent of groups k′ ∈ ⋃l−1u=0Ku, since the cost of users from groups
k′ ∈ ⋃l−1u=0Ku will be negligible compared with the cost of users from groups
k ∈ Kl. If this is the case, one can then check the scalability of groups
from Kl under the condition that users from groups k′ ∈
⋃l−1
u=0Ku adopt
strategies that they used in NE profiles f˜ (n) and SO profiles f ∗(n), respectively.
Moreover, if these groups are scalable, then (10) follows immediately for
m = l.
This procedure can tactically avoid the impact of possible irregular col-
lisions in the limit analysis by comparing the costs of users from different
classes Kl. If the above partition can be constructed, then the underlying
game decomposes into several asymptotically independent subgames corre-
sponding to the partition K0, . . . ,Kt. Although these subgames share re-
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source set A, they are asymptotically independent, since the choices of users
from one subgame will be asymptotically independent of those from other
subgames.
Asymptotic decomposition can be successfully applied to NCGs with ar-
bitrary polynomial price functions, which directly implies that NCGs with
arbitrary polynomial price functions are asymptotically well designed. Theo-
rem 2 summarizes this result. We move the detailed decomposition procedure
to the Appendix.
Theorem 2. Consider an NCG Γ with polynomial price functions τa(·) such
that each τa(x) is non-negative and non-decreasing for all x ≥ 0 for a ∈
A. Then, Γ is asymptotically decomposable, and thus asymptotically well
designed.
Proof. See the appendix.
Different from the direct sum in Subsection 3.2, an SO profile need not
be locally a system optimum w.r.t. some “marginals” corresponding to the
partition in the asymptotic decomposition. This introduces extra difficulties
in the application of scalability. The proof of Theorem 2 overcomes them
by considering SO profiles as NE profiles w.r.t. price functions ca(x) :=
xτ ′a(x) + τa(x), where each τ
′
a(·) is the derivative function of τa(·). Note that
NE profiles are still at (pure) Nash equilibrium w.r.t. each marginal under
the condition that users from other marginals adhere to the strategies they
used in corresponding NE profiles.
The proof of Theorem 2 is based on three basic properties of polynomial
functions. The first is that polynomial functions can be asymptotically sorted
according to their degrees, which forms a base for the cost comparison and
the construction of scaling factors at each inductive step. The second is that
the price functions ca(x) = xτ
′
a(x) + τa(x) are comparable with the price
functions τa(x), i.e., limx→∞
ca(x)
τa(x)
= qa for some constant qa ∈ (0,∞), when
all τa(·) are polynomials. This plays a pivotal role when we check scalability
for marginals in the inductive steps. The last properly is the relatively clear
structure of polynomial functions, from which we can obtain suitable scaling
factors g
(l)
n at each inductive step l.
The proof of Theorem 2 is very elementary. It does not involve any
advanced techniques, but only mathematical induction, basic calculus, and a
very crude ranking of non-negative functions. Therefore, it should be widely
readable.
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Theorem 2 fully settles the convergence of the PoA for arbitrary poly-
nomial price functions. This greatly extends the partial results from [6], [7]
and [28] for polynomial price functions. Due to the popularity of polynomial
functions, Theorem 2 may apply to a more general context other than road
traffic, e.g. the senario of free market mentioned in the Introduction.
3.4 A further extension: a general proof for regularly
varying price functions
The idea of asymptotic decomposition may apply also to NCGs with price
functions of other types. Polynomial functions are special cases of regularly
varying functions. This subsection aims to apply the asymptotic decompo-
sition to this more general notion.
By Karamata’s Characterization Theorem [3], a regularly varying func-
tion τ(·) can be written as
τ(x) = xρ ·Q(x),
where ρ ∈ R is called the regular variation index of τ(·) and Q(x) is a slowly
varying function, i.e., for each x > 0,
lim
t→∞
Q(tx)
Q(t)
= 1.
The class of regularly varying functions is very extensive and includes many
popular analytic functions, e.g., all affine functions, polynomials, logarithms,
and others.
Although regularly varying functions are more extensive than polynomial
functions, they actually have similar properties. Lemma 8 summarizes these
properties.
Lemma 8. Consider a regularly varying function τ(·) with index ρ ≥ 0.
Then, the following statements hold.
a) For each  > 0,
lim
x→∞
τ(x)
xρ+
= 0, and lim
x→∞
τ(x)
xρ−
=∞.
b) For each non-negative function g(·), if
lim
x→∞
g(x)
τ(x)
= q ∈ (0,∞)
for some constant q, then g(·) is also regularly varying with index ρ.
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c) For each regularly varying function g(·) with index ρ′, the qoutient
g(x)
τ(x)
is again regularly varying, but with index ρ′−ρ. Therefore, the qoutient
of two slowly varying non-zero functions is again slowly varying.
Proof. See the Appendix, or [3].
Lemma 8 a) and Lemma 8 c) indicate a partial ordering on the class
of regularly varying functions, i.e., regularly varying functions of different
indices can be sorted according to their indices. However, two regularly
varying functions of the same index are generally incomparable. Therefore,
we cannot directly reuse the simple ordering of polynomial functions when we
apply the asymptotic decomposition to NCGs with regularly varying func-
tions. Lemma 8 b) will be implicitly used in our discussion. It guarantees
that the auxiliary price functions ca(x) = xτ
′
a(x) + τa(x) are again regularly
varying and have the same indices as the price functions τa(x).
Due to the generality of regularly varying functions, we cannot have a
uniform argument. To simplify the discussion, we shall consider regularly
varying functions with particular properties in this Subsection, e.g., convex
and differentiable regularly varying functions.
Lemma 9. Consider a regularly varying function τ(·) that is non-decreasing,
non-negative, convex and differentiable on [0,∞). Then, the regular variation
index of ρ is non-negative, and
lim
x→∞
x · τ ′(x)
τ(x)
= ρ ≥ 0. (11)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 8 b) and Lemma 9 yield immediately that the auxiliary price
functions ca(x) = xτ
′
a(x) + τa(x) are again regularly varying, provided that
the price functions τa(x) are regularly varying and convex. Moreover, the
marginal games in an asymptotic decomposition will be asymptotically well
designed in this case, since (11) holds. We summarize this result in Theo-
rem 3.
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Theorem 3. Consider an NCG with price functions τa(·) satisfying all the
conditions of Lemma 9. If the price functions are mutually comparable, i.e.,
for each a, b ∈ A, the limit
lim
x→∞
τa(x)
τb(x)
= qa,b ∈ [0,∞]
exists for some constant qa,b, then Γ is asymptotically well designed.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Theorem 3 generalizes Corollary 4.8 in [7]. Colini et al. [7] showed that
NCGs with regularly varying and mutually comparable price functions τa(·)
are gaugeable w.r.t. each user volume vector sequence {d(n)}n∈N such that
limn→∞ T (d(n)) =∞ and limn→∞ d
(n)
k
T (d(n))
> 0 for each k ∈ K. Obviously, this
is only a partial result, due to the sequence-specific condition on {d(n)}n∈N
in Colini et al. [7]. With Lemma 3, such games are obviously scalable w.r.t.
these specific user volume sequences. With the asymptotic decomposition,
Theorem 3 now successfully removes the sequence limitation and gives a
global convergence of the PoA for such games, when the price functions τa(·)
are convex.
The condition that all τa(·) are mutually comparable implies a suitable
ordering on the τa(·), see the proof of Theorem 3 for details on the ordering.
By Lemma 8 b), this ordering also carries over to the auxiliary price functions
ca(·). Hence, the proof of Theorem 3 directly defines the ordering on the
resources a ∈ A. With this ordering, we can then compare the cost and
construct scaling factors at each inductive step.
Convexity is only needed to guarantee (11). The proof of Theorem 3 is
still valid if we use (11) instead of convexity. Therefore, Theorem 3 can be
further extended. For instance, if we substitute convexity by concavity in
Theorem 3, then the conclusion still holds.
Moreover, we can even weaken the condition that all price functions τa(·)
are regularly varying and mutually comparable. Actually, similar arguments
may still apply when only some of the price functions τa(·) are regularly
varying and mutually comparable. If this is the case, we need that for each
subset K′ ⊆ K, there exists a regularly varying function g(·) such that:
G1′) For each a ∈ A, the limit
lim
x→∞
τa(x)
g(x)
= qa ∈ [0,∞].
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G2′) For each k ∈ K′, there exists an strategy s ∈ Sk such that
max{qa : a ∈ A and r(a, s) > 0} <∞.
G3′) There exists a group k ∈ K′ such that
min
s∈Sk
max{qa : a ∈ A and r(a, s) > 0} ∈ (0,∞).
By additionally assuming condition (11), one can again obtain a proof for
this case by a slight modification of the proof of Theorem 3. Theorem 4
below summarizes this result.
Theorem 4. Consider an NCG Γ with non-decreasing, non-negative and
differentiable price functions τa(·). If (11) holds for each a ∈ A, and if for
each non-empty subset K′ ⊂ K there exists a regularly varying function g(·)
fulfilling G1′)-G3′), then Γ is asymptotically decomposable, and thus asymp-
totically well designed.
Proof. See the appendix.
Conditions G1′)-G3′) correspond to G1)-G3) in Definition 5 for gaugeabil-
ity. However, they are more flexible and general than gaugeability. They can
apply to arbitrary user volume sequences, while gaugeability only applies to
user volume sequences fulfilling condition (7). Hence, Theorem 4 is not only
an extension of Theorem 2, but also of the main result about gaugeability
(Theorem 4.4) in Colini et al. [7].
The proof of Theorem 4 does not need an ordering of the price functions
τa(·). Conditions G1′)-G3′) already imply the existence of suitable scaling
factors at each inductive step in the asymptotic decomposition. With these
scaling factors, we can then compare the cost of marginals.
Therefore, condition (11) and the existence of suitable scaling factors g
(l)
n
at each inductive step are pivotal when we apply the asymptotic decomposi-
tion. The ordering of price functions is only needed for constructing scaling
factors and comparing the cost of marginals at each inductive step. If the
existence of suitable scaling factors at each inductive step can be guarenteed
in advance, then we do not need such an ordering of the price functions. Note
that then the cost can be compared by comparing the scaling factors.
Actually, condition (11) may not be so restrictive for regularly varying
functions in practice. By Karamata’s Representation Theorem for slowly
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varying functions [3], each regularly varying function τ(·) can be written as
τ(x) = xρ · exp (η(x) + ∫ x
b
(t)
t
dt
)
,
where limx→∞ η(x) = κ ∈ R, limx→∞ (x) = 0 and b ≥ 0 is a constant
dependent of function τ(·). If τ(x) is differentiable and non-decreasing, then
we can assume w.l.o.g. that the bounded function η(x) is differentiable and
(x) is continuous. Then,
lim
x→∞
xτ ′(x)
τ(x)
= ρ+ lim
x→∞
xη′(x),
which is a non-negative constant when the limit limx→∞ xη′(x) exists. Note
that the limit limx→∞ xη′(x) exists if η(x) converges to κ eventually in a
relatively steady way. Such η(·) may possess some regular properties, e.g.,
convexity, concavity, monotonicity, and others.
Note that there are differentiable, non-decreasing and regularly varying
functions τ(x) that do not fulfill (11). For instance, consider τ(x) = x3 ·
exp
(
1 − 1
x
sin(x)
)
for large enough x. Here, η(x) = 1 − sinx
x
and the limit
limx→∞ xη′(x) does not exist, since xη′(x) = 1x sinx− cosx diverges as x →∞. Although such price functions are meaningful in theory, they may not be
of interest in practice because of their irregular properties.
Theorem 2, Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 further demonstrate the power of
scalability stemming from [28]. They together deepen our knowledge on user
behavior in NCGs. In particular, they positively support the view of [28]
that selfish user behavior need not be bad.
4 Conclusion
We have unified recent results from [8], [6], [7] and [28] on the convergence
of the PoA for NCGs. We have reformulated the concept of limit games that
are implicitly used in [28]. With the concept of limit games, we were able to
bring new insight into AWDGs, see, e.g., Theorem 1 and Corollary 2. We
have deepened the knowledge of scalability introduced by Wu et al. [28]. We
have introduced the technique of asymptotic decomposition that allows us to
analyze the convergence of the PoA for NCGs with general price functions.
With this new technique, we were able to show that NCGs with arbitrary
polynomial price functions τa(·) are asymptotically well designed, see Theo-
rem 2. This completes the results from [8], [6], [7] and [28] for NCGs with
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polynomial price functions. Moreover, we were able to apply the asymptotic
decomposition to NCGs with regularly varying price function, and prove
that these NCGs are also asymptotically well designed, see Theorem 3 and
Theorem 4. Our results definitely demonstrate the power of scalablity, and
positively support the view of [28] on user behavior in NCGs.
The profit goals of users in an NCG are in general inconsistent with
the profit goal of the underlying central authority. Both of them want to
minimize cost. But the difference is that users only locally minimize their own
cost, while the central authority wants to globally minimize social cost. Our
results show that the local minimization will lead to a glocal minimization
when the volume of users becomes large. Thus, selfishness need not be bad
in general.
Future work in this direction could consider the saturation point of an
NCG, i.e., a threshold value for user volumes, beyond which NE profiles will
almost be SO profiles. This could be very interesting in game theory. NCGs
are open games, i.e., users can freely join such games. When the user volume
reaches its saturation, what the users need to do is to perform as selfish as
possible, since this is the best choice in a bad environment.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider an NCG
Γ =
(
K, A,S, (r(a, s))a∈A,s∈S , (τa)a∈A, d
)
,
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and an arbitrary user volume vector sequence {d(n)}n∈N such that the total
volume T (d(n))→∞ as n→∞. Let f˜ (n) be an NE profile w.r.t. user volume
vector d(n) = (d
(n)
k )k∈K, for each n ∈ N. We assume that Γ has a limit
Γ∞ =
(
K∞, A,S∞, (r(a, s))a∈A,s∈S∞ , (τ∞a )a∈A,d
)
w.r.t. {d(n)}n∈N.
By Definition 3, we obtain that there is an infinite subsequence {ni}i∈N
and a sequence {gi}i∈N of positive scaling factors, s.t., conditions L1)-L4)
hold. Note that we can further assume that:
• The limit
lim
i→∞
f˜
(ni)
s
T (d(n))
= f˜
∞
s ∈ [0, 1]
exists, for some constant f˜
∞
s , for each s ∈ S.
Otherwsie, we can take an infinite subsequence {nij}j∈N fulfilling the above
condition. Let
f˜
∞
a :=
∑
s∈S
r(a, s) · f˜∞s
for each a ∈ A. We aim to prove Lemma 1 with the subsequence {ni}i∈N,
scaling factor sequence {gi}i∈N, and f˜∞ := (f˜∞s )s∈S∞ .
To that end, we need some auxiliary facts. Fact 1 below indicates that
prices of tight strategies are always well “preserved” in the limit w.r.t. any
sequence of feasible strategy profiles. Therefore, for each tight strategy s ∈
S∞, we obtain that
lim
i→∞
τs(f˜
(ni))
gi
=
∑
a∈A
r(a, s) · τa(f˜∞a ) <∞.
Fact 1. Consider a tight strategy s ∈ S∞. Let f (ni) be a feasible strategy
profile w.r.t. user volume vector d(ni), for each i ∈ N. If
lim
i→∞
f
(ni)
s′
T (d(ni))
= µs′
for some constant µs′ ∈ [0, 1], for each s′ ∈ S, then
τ∞s (µ) =
∑
a∈A
r(a, s) · τ∞a (µa) = lim
i→∞
∑
a∈A r(a, s) · τa(f (ni)a )
gi
,
where µa =
∑
s′∈S r(a, s
′)µs′ for each a ∈ A.
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Proof of Fact 1. Note that for each a ∈ A,
µa =
∑
s′∈S
r(a, s′)µs′ =
∑
s′∈S
r(a, s′) · lim
i→∞
f
(ni)
s′
T (d(ni))
= lim
i→∞
∑
s′∈S
r(a, s′)
f
(ni)
s′
T (d(ni))
= lim
i→∞
f
(ni)
a
T (d(ni))
∈ [0,∞).
Therefore, for an arbitrarily fixed  > 0,
max
{
0,µa − 
} ≤ f (ni)a
T (d(ni))
≤ µa + ,
for each resource a ∈ A, for i large enough. As a result, for i large enough,
we obtain for each a ∈ A that
τa
(
T (d(ni)) ·max{0,µa − }) ≤ τa(f (ni)a ) ≤ τa(T (d(ni)) · (µa + )), (12)
since each price function τa(·) is non-decreasing.
Since s is tight, by L3.2), we then obtain for each resource a ∈ A with
r(a, s) > 0 that τ∞a (·) is a continuous and non-decreasing function, and that
τ∞a (µa + ) = lim
i→∞
τa
(
T (d(ni)) · (µa + ))
gi
≥ lim
i→∞
τa(f
(ni)
a )
gi
≥ lim
i→∞
τa(f
(ni)
a )
gi
≥
τ∞a
(
max
{
0,µa − 
})
= lim
i→∞
τa
(
T (d(ni)) ·max{0,µa − })
gi
.
By (12), the continuity of τ∞a (·), and the arbitrary choice of , we then obtain
for each a ∈ A with r(a, s) > 0 that
τ∞a (µa) = lim
i→∞
τa(f
(ni))
gi
,
which, in turn, implies Fact 1.
Fact 2 below considers the limit prices of non-tight strategies w.r.t. NE
profiles. It indicates that we can completely ignore those non-tight strategies
in the limit analysis. By Fact 2, we obtain that
f˜
∞
a =
∑
s∈S
r(a, s) · f˜∞s =
∑
s∈S∞
r(a, s) · f˜∞s ,
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and that the limit volume
dk =
∑
s∈Sk∩S∞
f˜
∞
s
for each group k ∈ K∞, and that
dk =
∑
s∈Sk
f˜
∞
s = 0,
for each group k ∈ K\K∞ (since such groups do not have tight strategies).
Therefore, f˜
∞
= (f˜
∞
s )s∈S∞ is a strategy profile of the limit game Γ
∞ w.r.t.
user volume vector (dk)k∈K∞ and K∞.
Fact 2. Consider a non-tight strategy s ∈ S\S∞. Then, we obtain that:
1) f˜
∞
s = 0.
2) limi→∞
f˜
(ni)
s ·τs(f˜ (ni))
T (d(ni))·gi = 0.
Proof of Fact 2. Before we start the proof, let us recall a basic property of
non-tight strategies. By L2) and L3) of Definition 3, we obtain that
lim
i→∞
τa(T (d
(ni))x)
gi
= τ∞a (x) ≡ ∞, ∀x > 0,
for some a ∈ A with r(a, s) > 0, since s is non-tight.
For 1) : Let k ∈ K be the group such that s ∈ Sk. We prove 1) by
contradiction. We suppose that f˜
∞
s > 0. Then, by L2) of Definition 3, with
an argument similar to that for Lemma 1, we obtain that
lim
i→∞
τs(f˜
(ni))
gi
=∞, and lim
i→∞
f˜ (ni) · τs(f˜ (ni))
T (d(ni)) · gi =∞,
since f˜
∞
s > 0. Thus, by L3.1) of Definition 3, group k is non-negligible.
Hence, group k must have tight strategies. Let s′ ∈ Sk ∩ S∞ be a tight
strategy. By Fact 1, we obtain that
lim
i→∞
τs′(f˜
(ni))
gi
<∞ = lim
i→∞
τs(f˜
(ni))
gi
.
Hence, for i large enough,
τs′(f˜
(ni)) < τs(f˜
(ni)).
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This, in turn, implies that f˜
(ni)
s ≡ 0 for i large enough, due to the user
optimality (2) of NE profiles. This contradicts with the assumption that
f˜
∞
s > 0.
Therefore, f˜
∞
s = 0 must hold.
For 2) : We prove 2) again by contradiction. We assume that
lim
i→∞
f˜
(ni)
s · τs(f˜ (ni))
T (d(ni)) · gi > 0. (13)
By L3.1) of Definition 3, we obtain immediately that s must be a strategy
from some non-negligible group. We assume, w.l.o.g., that
lim
i→∞
f˜
(ni)
s · τs(f˜ (ni))
T (d(ni)) · gi = limi→∞
f˜
(ni)
s · τs(f˜ (ni))
T (d(ni)) · gi > 0.
Otherwise, one can take an infinite subsequence of {ni}i∈N fulfilling the above
condition.
By 1), we can obtain that
lim
i→∞
f˜
(ni)
s
T (d(ni))
= f˜
∞
s = 0,
and thus
lim
i→∞
τs(f˜
(ni))
gi
=∞.
Then, with an argument argument similar as that in the proof of 1), one can
prove again that f˜
(ni)
s ≡ 0 for i large enough. This yields that
f˜
(ni)
s · τs(f˜ (ni))
T (d(ni)) · gi ≡ 0,
for i large enough. This obviously contradicts with the assumption (13).
Hence, 2) must hold.
By Fact 1 and Fact 2, we obtain immediately that
lim
i→∞
C(f˜ (ni))
gi
= lim
i→∞
∑
s∈S∞ f˜
(ni)
s · τs(f˜ (ni))
T (d(ni)) · gi =
∑
s∈S∞
f˜
∞
s · τ∞s (f˜
∞
).
The fact that f˜
∞
is an NE profile of Γ∞ follows immediately from that limit
preserves numerical ordering “≥”.
Combining all of the above, the proof of Lemma 1 is completed.
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Proof of Theorem 1
Proof of Theorem 1. Consider an NCG
Γ =
(
K, A,S, (r(a, s))a∈A,s∈S , (τa)a∈A, d
)
,
and an arbitrary user volume vector sequence {d(n)}n∈N such that the total
volume T (d(n))→∞ as n→∞.
We assume that the game
Γ∞ =
(
K∞, A,S∞, (r(a, s))a∈A,s∈S∞ , (τ∞a )a∈A,d
)
is the limit game of Γ w.r.t. a subsequence {ni}i∈N and a scaling factor se-
quence {gi}i∈N, where all the components of Γ∞ are defined as in Definition 3.
We suppose that Γ∞ is not well designed. We aim to show in this case that
the PoA(d(ni)) does not converge to 1 as i→∞, which, in turn, implies that
the game Γ is not asymptotically well designed.
Let {f˜ (ni)}i∈N and {f ∗(ni)}i∈N be an NE profile sequence and an SO profile
sequence w.r.t. {d(ni)}i∈N, respectively. We assume, w.l.o.g., that
• the limits
lim
i→∞
f˜
(ni)
s
T (d(ni))
= f˜
∞
s ∈ [0, 1], and lim
i→∞
f
∗(ni)
s
T (d(ni))
= f ∗,∞s ∈ [0, 1]
exist for some constants f˜
∞
s ,f
∗,∞
s , for each s ∈ S. Otherwise, we can take
an infinite subsequence of {ni}i∈N fulfilling this condition.
By Fact 1 and Fact 2 in the proof of Lemma 1, we obtain immediately
that
lim
i→∞
C(f˜ (ni))
gi
=
∑
s∈S∞
f˜
∞
s · τ∞s (f˜
∞
) ∈ (0,∞),
lim
i→∞
∑
s∈S∞ f
∗((ni))
s · τs(f ∗(ni))
T (d(ni)) · gi =
∑
s∈S∞
f ∗,∞s · τ∞s (f ∗,∞) ∈ [0,∞),
and that f˜
∞
= (f˜
∞
s )s∈S∞ is an NE profile of Γ
∞.
We now aim to show that Fact 2 applies also to SO profiles.
By the fact that each f ∗(ni) is an SO profile, we then obtain immediately
that
lim
i→∞
C(f ∗(ni))
gi
≤ lim
i→∞
C(f˜ (ni))
gi
<∞,
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which, in turn, implies that for each non-tight strategy s ∈ S\S∞, f ∗,∞s = 0.
Otherwise, if f ∗,∞s > 0, then by L3) of Defition 3, limi→∞
C(f∗(ni))
gi
=∞.
Therefore, f ∗,∞ = (f ∗,∞s )s∈S∞ is also a feasible strategy profile of Γ
∞.
We now aim to prove for each non-tight strategy s ∈ S\S∞ that
lim
i→∞
f
∗(ni)
s · τs(f ∗(ni))
T (d(ni)) · gi = 0.
Similarly, we prove this by contradiction. We assume, w.l.o.g., that there is
exactly one non-tight strategy, i.e., |S\S∞| = 1. Let s denote this unique non-
tight strategy. For the case of more non-tight strategies, an almost identical
argument will apply.
We assume now, w.l.o.g., that
lim
i→∞
f
∗(ni)
s · τs(f ∗(ni))
T (d(ni)) · gi > 0. (14)
Then, by L3.1) of Definition 3, s must be a strategy from some non-negligible
group k ∈ K. By L3.2) of Definition 3, there must exist a tight strategy
s′ ∈ Sk. To derive a contradiction to (14), we now construct some artificial
feasible strategy profiles. For each i ∈ N, we put
h
(ni)
s′′ =

f
∗(ni)
s′′ if s
′′ /∈ {s, s′},
f
∗(ni)
s′′ + f
∗(ni)
s if s′′ = s′,
0 if s′′ = s.
For the case of more than one non-tight strategies, one can similarly move the
users adopting non-tight strategies to tight strategies. However, the explicit
definition of profiles h(ni) = (h
(ni)
s′′ )s′′∈S will become very complicated.
Obviously, for each s′′ ∈ S,
lim
i→∞
h
(ni)
s′′
T (d(ni))
= f ∗,∞s′′ ,
since f ∗,∞s = 0. Moreover, by Fact 1 of Lemma 1, we obtain that
lim
i→∞
∑
s′′∈S∞ h
(ni)
s′′ · τs′′(h(ni))
T (d(ni))gi
= lim
i→∞
∑
s′′∈S∞ f
∗(ni)
s′′ · τs′′(f ∗(ni))
T (d(ni))gi
=
∑
s′′∈S∞
f ∗,∞s′′ · τ∞s′′ (f ∗,∞).
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Note that in profiles h(ni), only tight strategies are used. Thus, we obtain
that
lim
i→∞
C(h(ni))
gi
= lim
i→∞
∑
s′′∈S∞ f
∗(ni)
s′′ · τs′′(f ∗(ni))
T (d(ni)) · gi .
With (14), we obtain further that
lim
i→∞
C(f ∗(ni))
gi
> lim
i→∞
∑
s′′∈S∞ f
∗(ni)
s′′ · τs′′(f ∗(ni))
T (d(ni)) · gi = limi→∞
C(h(ni))
gi
.
This yields that
C(h(ni)) < C(f ∗(ni))
for i large enough. This contradicts with the fact that profiles f ∗(ni) are all
system optimum.
Therefore, Fact 2 also applies to SO profiles. Thus we obtain that
lim
i→∞
C(f ∗(ni))
gi
=
∑
s∈S∞
f ∗,∞s · τ∞s (f ∗,∞).
We now aim to show that f ∗,∞ is an SO profile of Γ∞. Let f = (f s)s∈S∞
be an arbitrary feasible strategy profile of Γ∞. To show that f ∗,∞ is an SO
profile of Γ∞, we only need to show that its cost is not larger than the cost
of f , due to the arbitrary choice of f . Note that there must exist a sequence
{f (ni)}i∈N of feasible profiles such that
f s = lim
i→∞
f
(ni)
s
T (d(ni))
for each tight strategy s ∈ S∞. Actually, we can put for each k ∈ K∞ with
d
(ni)
k > 0 and s ∈ Sk that
f (ni)s =
d
(ni)
k · f s
dk
∀i ∈ N,
and put for each other k ∈ K and s ∈ Sk that
f (ni)s =
d
(ni)
k
|Sk| ∀i ∈ N.
Since each f ∗(ni) is system optimal, we obtain that
C(f ∗(ni))
gi
≤ C(f
(ni))
gi
∀i ∈ N.
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Letting i→∞, this yields by Fact 1, L3) and the definition of K∞ that
lim
i→∞
C(f ∗(ni))
gi
=
∑
s∈S∞
f ∗,∞ · τ∞s (f ∗,∞) ≤
∑
s∈S∞
f s · τ∞s (f) = lim
i→∞
C(f (ni))
gi
,
since f defines only on tight strategies, and since each group k ∈ K\K∞ is
negligible without tight strategy and thus must have zero limit volume, i.e.,
dk = 0. Hence, f
∗,∞ is an SO profile of Γ∞.
Since Γ∞ is not well designed, we thus obtain that∑
s∈S∞
f ∗,∞s · τ∞s (f ∗,∞) <
∑
s∈S∞
f˜
∞
s · τ∞s (f˜
∞
).
This implies that
lim
i→∞
PoA(d(ni)) = lim
i→∞
C(f˜ (ni))
C(f ∗(ni))
=
∑
s∈S∞ f˜
∞
s · τ∞s (f˜
∞
)∑
s∈S∞ f
∗,∞
s · τ∞s (f ∗,∞)
> 1.
Therefore, Γ is not well designed.
Proof of Theorem 2
Proof of Theorem 2. We prove Theorem 2 by applying the idea of asymptotic
decomposition. To well demonstrate the idea, we will give a very detailed
proof. The proof will be direct and elementary without using a heavy ma-
chinery. It only uses the definition and connection between NE profiles and
SO profiles, simple facts about the asymptotic notations O(·),Ω(·),Θ(·), o(·)
and ω(·), and a suitable induction along the user groups.
Let {d(n)}n∈N be an arbitrary sequence of user volume vectors such that:
• Each d(n) = (d(n)1 , . . . , d(n)K ) is a vector, where the k-th component d(n)k
represents the user volume of the k-th group for k = 1, . . . , K, for each
n ∈ N.
• The total user volume T (d(n)) = ∑Kk=1 d(n)k → +∞ as n→ +∞.
To prove the Theorem 2, we only need to show that limn→∞ PoA(d(n)) = 1,
due to the arbitrary choice of the user volume vector sequence {d(n)}n∈N.
Note that
lim
n→∞
PoA(d(n)) = 1 (15)
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follows immediately from the fact that
lim
n→∞
PoA(d(n)) = 1,
since it holds trivially that
lim
n→∞
PoA(d(n)) ≥ 1.
Therefore, we assume, w.l.o.g., that the limit
lim
n→∞
PoA(d(n)) ∈ [1,+∞] (16)
exists. Otherwise, we can take an infinite subsequence {ni}i∈N such that the
limit
lim
i→∞
PoA(d(ni)) = lim
n→∞
PoA(d(n)) ∈ [1,+∞]
exists, and we can then restrict our discussion to this subsequence.
With assumption (16), (15) follows immediately from the existence of an
infinite subsequence {ni}i∈N, s.t.,
lim
i→∞
PoA(d(ni)) = 1.
So, in the application of asymptotic decomposition, we can take a series of
nested infinite subsequences of the sequence {n}n∈N. To simplify notation, we
will not explicitly use the terminology of subsequences, but assume that the
user volume vector sequence {d(n)}n∈N itself fulfills some required properties,
if corresponding subsequences do exist.
We now introduce some notations stemming from [6]. Let ρα be the
degree of the polynomial τa(·) for each resource a ∈ A. Accordingly, we can
define the degree of a strategy s ∈ Sk as
ρs := max{ρa : r(a, s) > 0 and a ∈ A},
and the degree of a group k ∈ {1, . . . , K} as
ρk := min{ρs : s ∈ Sk}.
Although these notations are trivial, they help us construct a suitable or-
dering on the resource set A, and accordingly on the sets S and K. We can
compare two resources a, b ∈ A through their degrees ρa, ρb. This will be very
helpful when we construct the scaling factors at each inductive step in the
asymptotic decomposition.
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Moreover, we need to compare cost at each inductive step during asymp-
totic decomposition. This requires basic knowledge on the asymptotic nota-
tion. Let h(x) be a non-negative real-valued function. The big O notation
O
(
h(x)
)
denotes the class of all non-negative real-valued functions q(x) such
that limx→∞
q(x)
h(x)
< +∞, and the small o notation o(h(x)) denotes the class
of all non-negative real-valued functions q(x) such that limx→∞
q(x)
h(x)
= 0.
Similarly, Ω
(
h(x)
)
denotes the class of all non-negative real-valued func-
tions q(x) such that limx→∞
q(x)
h(x)
> 0, and ω
(
h(x)
)
denotes the class of all
non-negative real-valued functions q(x) such that limx→∞
q(x)
h(x)
= +∞. We
put Θ
(
h(x)
)
= O
(
h(x)
) ∩ Ω(h(x)). In addition, we write h(x) ≈ q(x) if
limx→∞
h(x)
q(x)
= 1.
Let f ∗(n), f˜ (n) be an SO profile and an NE profile, respectively, w.r.t. user
volume vector d(n) = (d
(n)
k )k∈K, for each n ∈ N. Then, for each n ∈ N,
PoA(d(n)) =
C(f˜ (n))
C(f ∗(n))
=
∑
k∈K
∑
s∈Sk f˜
(n)
s · τs(f˜ (n))∑
k∈K
∑
s∈Sk f
∗(n)
s · τs(f ∗(n))
. (17)
Let Ck(f˜
(n)) :=
∑
s∈Sk f˜
(n)
s · τs(f˜ (n)) and Ck(f ∗(n)) :=
∑
s∈Sk f
∗(n)
s · τs(f ∗(n))
denote the total cost of users from group k ∈ K w.r.t. NE profile f˜ (n) and SO
profile f ∗(n), respectively, for all k ∈ K and each n ∈ N. By (17), we obtain
for each n ∈ N that
PoA(d(n)) =
∑
k∈K Ck(f˜
(n))∑
k∈K Ck(f
∗(n))
. (18)
We are now ready to start the asymptotic decomposition. We aim to
inductively partition the set K into mutually disjoint non-empty subsets
K0,K1, . . . ,Kt for some integer t ≥ 0, and prove at each step m = 0, . . . , t
that
lim
n→∞
∑
k∈⋃mu=0Ku Ck(f˜ (n))∑
k∈⋃mu=0Ku Ck(f ∗(n)) = 1. (19)
This procedure will not only form a proof for Theorem 2, but also asymp-
totically decompose the underlying game.
Step m = 0 : construct K0, and prove (19) for m = 0.
Before we formally start step m = 0, we first introduce a trivial but useful
fact about NE profiles.. Note that for each n ∈ N and each k ∈ K, by the
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user optimality (2), users from group k have the same cost L˜
(n)
k w.r.t. the
NE profile f˜ (n). Then, we obtain that
C(f˜ (n)) =
1
T (d(n))
∑
k∈N
L˜
(n)
k · d(n)k .
By [19], each SO profile f ∗(n) is actually an NE profile w.r.t. to the
auxiliary price functions ca(x) :=
(
x · τa(x)
)′
= x · τ ′a(x) + τa(x), for each
n ∈ N. Obviously, each ca(·) is again a polynomial of the same degree as
τa(·), for each a ∈ A. Let L˜∗(n)k be the cost of users from group k ∈ K w.r.t.
price functions ca(·) and the corresponding NE profile f ∗(n), for each n ∈ N.
Since τa(x) ∈ Θ
(
ca(x)
)
for each a ∈ A, the cost of each user from group
k ∈ K is then in Θ(L∗(n)k ) w.r.t. SO profiles f ∗(n) and price functions τa(·).
As a key component at each step of the asymptotic decomposition, we
are now to estimate L˜
(n)
k , L
∗(n)
k for each k ∈ K. This will be the base for the
cost comparison. Claim 1 below states that the degree ρk of a group k ∈ K
reflects the magnitude of the cost of its users in both, NE and SO profiles.
Claim 1. L˜
(n)
k , L
∗(n)
k ∈ O
(
T (d(n))ρk
)
, for each group k ∈ K.
Proof of Claim 1. Let k ∈ {1, . . . , K} be an arbitrarily fixed user group.
By the definition of ρk, there must exist some strategy s0 ∈ Sk, such that
ρs0 = ρk = min{ρs : s ∈ Sk}. Let f (n) be an arbitrary feasible strategy profile
w.r.t. user volume vector d(n), for each n ∈ N. Then τs0(f (n)) ∈ O
(
T (d(n))ρk
)
,
since there are at most T (d(n)) users adopting strategy s0 and the degree of s0
is ρk. Therefore, τs0(f
∗(n)), τs0(f˜
(n)) ∈ O(T (d(n))ρk). By the user optimality
(2) of NE profiles, we thus obtain that
L˜
(n)
k ≤ τs0(f˜ (n)) ∈ O
(
T (d(n))ρk
)
.
Recall that cs0(f
∗(n)) ∈ Θ(τs0(f ∗(n))), and f ∗(n) is an SO profile w.r.t.
price functions ca(·), for each n ∈ N. Therefore, again by (2), we obtain that
L
∗(n)
k ≤ cs0(f ∗(n)) ∈ O
(
T (d(n))ρk
)
.
We can now formally start step m = 0. To facilitate our discussion, we
assume, w.l.o.g., that
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• the limit limn→∞ d
(n)
k
T0(d(n))
=: d
(0,∞)
k exists for some constant d
(0,∞)
k ∈
[0, 1], for all k = 1, . . . , K, where T0(d
(n)) := T (d(n)),
• the limits
lim
n→∞
f
∗(n)
s
T0(d(n))
=: f ∗(0,∞)s and lim
n→∞
f˜
(n)
s
T0(d(n))
=: f˜
(0,∞)
s
exist for some constants f ∗(0,∞)s , f˜
(0,∞)
s ∈ [0, 1], for each strategy s ∈ S.
Otherwise, we can take an infinite subsequence fulfilling these two conditions.
For each a ∈ A, let
f˜
(0,∞)
a :=
∑
s∈S
r(a, s) · f˜ (0,∞)s and f ∗(0,∞)a :=
∑
s∈S
r(a, s) · f ∗(0,∞)s .
We now define K0. Let α0 := max{ρk : d(0,∞)k > 0, k ∈ K} and K0 :=
{k ∈ K : d(0,∞)k > 0 or ρk ≤ α0}. Note that K0 6= ∅, and there exist some
k ∈ K0 such that
d
(0,∞)
k > 0 and ρk = α0.
Note also that both (f˜
(0,∞)
s )s∈Sk,k∈K0 and (f
∗(0,∞)
s )s∈Sk,k∈K0 are feasible strate-
gies for the user volume vector d(0,∞) := (d(0,∞)k )k∈K0 , i.e.,
d
(0,∞)
k =
∑
s∈Sk
f˜
(0,∞)
s =
∑
s∈Sk
f ∗(0,∞)s ∀k ∈ K0.
Moreover, for each k ∈ K\K0 and s ∈ Sk,
f˜
(0.∞)
s = 0, and f
∗(0,∞)
s = 0,
and thus for each a ∈ A,
f˜
(0,∞)
a =
∑
s∈⋃k∈K0 Sk
r(a, s) · f˜ (0,∞)s and f ∗(0,∞)a =
∑
s∈⋃k∈K0 Sk
r(a, s) · f ∗(0,∞)s .
By Claim 1, L˜
(n)
k , L
∗(n)
k ∈ O
(
T0(d
(n))α0
)
for each k ∈ K0.
It remains at step 0 to prove (19) for m = 0. Claim 2 asserts this. It
states that the average cost of users from groups k ∈ K0 w.r.t. NE profiles
f˜ (n) will be asymptotically equal to that of those users w.r.t. SO profiles
f ∗(n), no matter which strategies the users from the other groups k ∈ K\K0
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adopt. The proof of Claim 2 is inspired by the proof of the main result
Theorem 3.2 in [28]. However, here, we need an additional argument for SO
profiles f ∗(n), since they now need not be SO profiles of the marginal game
consisting of groups k ∈ K0. The idea to handle this is to consider profiles
f ∗(n) as NE profiles of the corresponding game with auxiliary price functions
ca(·). Interestingly, the two corresponding marginal games converge to limit
games sharing NE profiles, since
lim
x→∞
ca(x)
τa(x)
= 1 + ρa (20)
for each a ∈ A. A trivial fact hidden in the proof is that users from groups
k ∈ K\K0 do not affect the limit behavior of users from K0, since they only
account for a negligible limit proportion in the whole user volume. This
makes it possible to independently consider groups k ∈ K0 in the limit anal-
ysis.
Claim 2.
lim
n→∞
∑
k∈K0 Ck(f˜
(n))∑
k∈K0 Ck(f
∗(n))
= 1.
Moreover, ∑
k∈K0
Ck(f˜
(n)),
∑
k∈K0
Ck(f
∗(n)) ∈ Θ(T (d(n))α0+1).
Proof of Claim 2. The main step of this proof is to show that the marginal
game consisting of all groups in K0 will “converge” to a limit game with user
volume vector d(0,∞) =(d(0,∞)k )k∈K0 , and (f˜
(0,∞)
s )s∈Sk,k∈K0 and (f
∗(0,∞)
s )s∈Sk,k∈K0
are both NE profiles of the limit game. To show this, we employ a similar
argument as in the proof of Theorem 3.2 in [28].
Let gn := T0(d
(n))α0 be a scaling factor for each n ∈ N. Note that for each
resource a ∈ A and each x > 0,
lim
n→∞
τa
(
T0(d
(n))x
)
gn
=: τ (0,∞)a (x) =

0, if ρa < α0,
bα · xα0 , if ρa = α0,
∞, otherwise,
and
lim
n→∞
ca
(
T0(d
(n))x
)
gn
=: c(0,∞)a (x) =

0, if ρa < α0,
bα · (α0 + 1) · xα0 , if ρa = α0,
∞, otherwise,
(21)
where bα > 0 is the coefficient of term x
α0 in the polynomial τa(·) if τa(·) has
degree α0, for all a ∈ A.
44
Let us define the two “limit” games
Γ(0,∞)τ :=
(K0, A, ⋃
k∈K0
Sk, (r(a, s))a∈A,s∈Sk,k∈K0 , (τ (0,∞)a )a∈A,d(0,∞)
)
and
Γ(0,∞)c :=
(K0, A, ⋃
k∈K0
Sk, (r(a, s))a∈A,s∈Sk,k∈K0 , (c(0,∞)a )a∈A,d(0,∞)
)
.
Obviously, Γ
(0,∞)
τ and Γ
(0,∞)
c have the same NE profiles and SO profiles, since
ca(x)
(0,∞) = (α0 + 1) · τa(x)(0,∞) for all a ∈ A.
We now aim to show that (f˜
(0,∞)
s )s∈Sk,k∈K0 is an NE profile of the game
Γ
(0,∞)
τ . Let us arbitrarily fix some k ∈ K0 and two strategies s, s′ ∈ Sk with
f˜
(0,∞)
s > 0. This implies by Fact 2 that s is tight. By L3) of Definition 3, we
obtain that τ
(0,∞)
s (f˜
(0,∞)
) <∞. Thus, if τ (0,∞)s′
(
f˜
(0,∞))
=∞, then
τ (0,∞)s
(
f˜
(0,∞)) ≤ τ (0,∞)s′ (f˜ (0,∞)). (22)
We now assume that τ
(0,∞)
s′ (f˜
(0,∞)
) <∞. Then, by L3) of Definition 3, s′ is
also tight. We will prove that (22) still holds in this case, which, in turn,
implies that (f˜
(0,∞)
s )s∈Sk,k∈K0 is an NE profile of the game Γ
(0,∞)
τ , due to the
arbitrary choice of s, s′.
We recall that
lim
n→∞
f˜
(n)
s
T0(d(n))
= f˜
(0,∞)
s > 0.
Thus, we obtain for large enough n that
f˜
(n)
s
T0(d(n))
> 0,
which implies that f˜
(n)
s > 0 for large enough n. Since each f˜ (n) is an NE
profile for each n ∈ N, we further obtain by the user optimality (2) that
τs(f˜
(n)) ≤ τs′(f˜ (n))
for large enough n. Hence, by Fact 1 in the proof of Lemma 1, we obtain
that
τ (0,∞)s (f˜
(0,∞)
) = lim
n→∞
τs(f˜
(n))
gn
≤ lim
n→∞
τs′(f˜
(n))
gn
= τ
(0,∞)
s′ (f˜
(0,∞)
),
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since both s and s′ are tight.
Hence, (f˜
(0,∞)
s )s∈Sk,k∈K0 is an NE profile of the game Γ
(0,∞)
τ . Similarly, we
can prove that (f ∗(0,∞)s )s∈Sk,k∈K0 is an NE profile of the game Γ
(0,∞)
c , which, in
turn, implies that (f ∗(0,∞)s )s∈Sk,k∈K0 is also an NE profile of the game Γ
(0,∞)
τ .
Therefore, (f˜
(0,∞)
s )s∈Sk,k∈K0 and (f
∗(0,∞)
s )s∈Sk,k∈K0 have equal cost w.r.t. the
game Γ
(0,∞)
τ . Hence,∑
k∈K0
∑
s∈Sk:ρs≤α0 f˜
(0,∞)
s ·
∑
a∈A r(a, s) · τ (0,∞)a (f˜
(0,∞)
a )∑
k∈K0
∑
s∈Sk:ρs≤α0 f
∗(0,∞)
s ·
∑
a∈A r(a, s) · τ (0,∞)a (f ∗(0,∞)a )
= 1, (23)
where we observe the fact that for k ∈ K0, each strategy q ∈ Sk with degree
ρq > α0 will be non-tight, since there exists a strategy p ∈ Sk with ρp =
ρk ≤ α0. Moreover, both the numerator and denominator in (23) are positive
and finite, i.e., in Θ(1), since there exists a k ∈ K0 such that d(0,∞)k > 0 and
ρk = α0.
By Fact 1 and Fact 2 in the proof of Lemma 1, we obtain immediately
that
lim
n→∞
∑
k∈K0 Ck(f˜
(n))
T (d(n)) · gn =
∑
k∈K0
∑
s∈Sk:ρs≤α0
f˜
(0,∞)
s ·
∑
a∈A
r(a, s) · τ (0,∞)a (f˜
(0,∞)
a )
∈ Θ(1),
(24)
and
lim
n→∞
∑
k∈K0 Ck(f
∗(n))
T (d(n)) · gn =
∑
k∈K0
∑
s∈Sk:ρs≤α0
f ∗(0,∞)s ·
∑
a∈A
r(a, s) · τ (0,∞)a (f ∗(0,∞)a )
∈ Θ(1).
(25)
Here (25) is obtained from the fact that profiles f ∗(n) are NE profiles of the
corresponding game with price functions ca(·), and that
lim
n→∞
ca
(
T (d(n))z
)
gn
= c(0,∞)a (z) = (1+ρa)τ
(0,∞)
a (z) = (1+ρa)· lim
n→∞
τa
(
T (d(n))z
)
gn
.
(26)
Claim 2 then follows from (23), (24) and (25).
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In the proof of Claim 2, (20) and the scaling factors gn play pivotal roles
as the equation (26) does not hold without them.
If K0 = K, then we have already finished the decomposition and com-
pleted the proof of Theorem 2 by Claim 2. We assume now that K\K0 6= ∅.
In this case, we need to further partition K\K0 and proceed to step m = 1.
Step m = 1: contruct K1, and prove (19) for m = 1.
To facilitate our discussion, we will first define some notations and propose
further assumptions on the fixed user volume sequence {d(n)}n∈N.
For each n ∈ N and each a ∈ A, we denote by
τ (1,n)a (x) := τa
(
x+ f˜ (n)a (K0)
)
and c(1,n)a (x) := ca
(
x+ f ∗(n)a (K0)
)
the price function of resource a under the condition that the users from groups
k ∈ K0 stick to strategies they used in NE profiles f˜ (n) and SO profiles f ∗(n),
respectively. Here,
f˜ (n)a (K0) :=
∑
k∈K0
∑
s∈Sk
∑
a∈A
r(a, s)f˜ (n)s ∈ O
(
T0(d
(n))
)
and
f ∗(n)a (K0) :=
∑
k∈K0
∑
s∈Sk
∑
a∈A
r(a, s)f ∗(n)s ∈ O
(
T0(d
(n))
)
denote the volumes of resource a consumed by users from groups k ∈ K0
w.r.t. NE profile f˜ (n) and SO profile f ∗(n), repectively, for each a ∈ A and
each n ∈ N.
Let f ∗(n)(K\K0) := (f ∗(n)s )k∈K\K0:s∈Sk and f˜ (n)(K\K0) := (f˜ (n)s )k∈K\K0:s∈Sk
be the “marginal” profiles consisting of users from the remaining groups
K\K0 w.r.t. the SO profilef ∗(n) and NE profile f˜ (n), respectively, for each
n ∈ N. Obviously,
τ (1,n)a
(
f˜ (n)(K\K0)
)
= τa
(
f˜ (n)
)
and c(1,n)a
(
f ∗(n)(K\K0)
)
= ca
(
f ∗(n)
)
for each a ∈ A and each n ∈ N.
Let
Γ(1,n)τ :=
(K\K0,A, ⋃
k∈K\K0
Sk,(r(a, s))a∈A,s∈Sk,k∈K\K0 ,(τ (1,n)a )a∈A,(d(n)k )k∈K\K0
)
and
Γ(1,n)c :=
(K\K0,A, ⋃
k∈K\K0
Sk,(r(a, s))a∈A,s∈Sk,k∈K\K0 ,(c(1,n)a )a∈A,(d(n)k )k∈K\K0
)
47
be the corresponding marginal games under the condition that users from
groups in K0 stick to the strategies they used in NE profile f˜ (n) and SO
profile f ∗(n), respectively, for each n ∈ N. Obviously, profiles f˜ (n)(K\K0)
and f ∗(n)(K\K0) are NE profiles of the two marginal games Γ(1,n)τ and Γ(1,n)c ,
respectively, w.r.t. the user volume vector (d
(n)
k )k∈K\K0 , for each n ∈ N.
At step m = 1, we shall employ an argument similar to that for step
m = 0. However, we shall now consider the marginal profiles and the marginal
games consisting of groups from K\K0.
Let T1(d
(n)) =
∑
k∈K\K0 d
(n)
k be the total volume of users from groups in
K\K0, for each n ∈ N. Then, T1(d(n)) ∈ o
(
T0(d
(n))
)
. Then, it follows trivially
for the price functions τ
(1,n)
a (·) and c(1,n)a (·) that, for each x ≥ 0,
τ (1,n)a (T1(d
(n))x) ∈ Θ
(
max
{
τa
(
T1(d
(n))x
)
, τa
(
f˜ (n)a (K0)
)})
(27)
and
c(1,n)a (T1(d
(n))x) ∈ Θ
(
max
{
ca
(
T1(d
(n))x
)
, ca
(
f ∗(n)a (K0)
)})
, (28)
for each a ∈ A, since both τa(·) and ca(·) are asymptotically non-decreasing
polynomials for all a ∈ A.
Similarly, we assume, w.l.o.g., that
• the limit limn→∞ d
(n)
k
T1(d(n))
=: d
(1,∞)
k exists for some constant d
(1,∞)
k ∈
[0, 1], for each k ∈ K\K0,
• the limits
lim
n→∞
f˜
(n)
s
T1(d(n))
=: f˜
(1,∞)
s and lim
n→∞
f
∗(n)
s
T1(d(n))
=: f ∗(1,∞)s
exist for some constants f˜
(1,∞)
s ,f
∗(1,∞)
s ∈ [0, 1] for each k ∈ K\K0 and
each s ∈ Sk.
Otherwise, we can again take an infinite subsequence {ni}i∈N fulfilling these
two conditions. Again, let
f˜
(1,∞)
a :=
∑
k∈K\K0
∑
s∈Sk
r(a, s) · f˜ (1,∞)s =
∑
k∈K1
∑
s∈Sk
r(a, s) · f˜ (1,∞)s
and
f ∗(1,∞)a :=
∑
k∈K\K0
∑
s∈Sk
r(a, s) · f ∗(1,∞)s =
∑
k∈K1
∑
s∈Sk
r(a, s) · f ∗(1,∞)s
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for each resource a ∈ A, where K1 is defined below.
Now we are ready to partition K\K0. We define α1 := max{ρk : k ∈
K\K0,d(1,∞)k > 0} > α0, and K1 := {k ∈ K\K0 : ρk ≤ α1}. Obviously,∑
k∈K1
d
(n)
k
T1(d(n))
→
∑
k∈K1
d
(1,∞)
k = 1 as n→∞,
and there exists k ∈ K1 such that ρk = α1 and d(n)k ∈ Θ
(
T1(d
(n))
)
.
To show (19), we need a tighter bound of L˜
(n)
k and L
∗(n)
k for each k ∈ K1.
Note that for each k ∈ K1, L˜(n)k is still the cost of users from group k w.r.t. the
(marginal) NE profile f˜ (n)(K\K0) and the (marginal) game Γ(1,n)τ . Similarly,
L
∗(n)
k is still the cost of users from group k w.r.t. the (marginal) NE profile
f ∗(n)(K\K0) and the (marginal) game Γ(1,n)c , for each n ∈ N.
Similar to the Claim 2 at step m = 0, Claim 3 estimates the cost of users
w.r.t. the two marginal games and corresponding NE profiles.
Claim 3. For each group k ∈ K1,
L˜
(n)
k , L
∗(n)
k ∈ O
(
max{g(0)n , g(1)n }
)
,
where g
(0)
n = T0(d
(n))α0 is the scaling factor at step m = 0, and g
(1)
n =
T1(d
(n))α1 will be the scaling factor used at step m = 1, for each n ∈ N.
Proof of Claim 3. We first prove that for each resource a ∈ A,
τa
(
f ∗(n)a (K0)
)
, τa(f˜
(n)
a
(K0)) ∈ O(g(0)n ). (29)
We only prove this for NE profiles f˜ (n). An almost identical argument applies
to the SO profiles f ∗(n).
Consider an arbitrarily fixed a ∈ A. If f˜ (n)a (K0) =
∑
s∈Sk′ ,k′∈K0 r(a, s) ·
f˜
(n)
s > 0, then f˜
(n)
s > 0 for some s ∈ Sk′ with r(a, s) > 0 and for some
k′ ∈ K0. By Claim 1, if f˜ (n)s > 0, i.e., s is used by some users from group
k′ ∈ K0, then
τs(f˜
(n)) = L˜
(n)
k′ ∈ O
(
T (d(n))α0
)
= O(g(0)n ),
which in turn implies that
τa
(
f˜ (n)a (K0)
) ∈ O(g(0)n )
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since
τa
(
f˜ (n)a (K0)
) ≤ τs(f˜ (n)).
If f˜
(n)
a (K0) = 0, then
τa
(
f˜ (n)a (K0)
)
= ηa ∈ Θ(1),
for some constant ηa ≥ 0. Thus we obtain that
τa
(
f˜ (n)a (K0)
) ∈ O(g(n)n ).
A similar result holds for SO profiles f ∗(n).
We are now ready to finish the proof of Claim 3. We first prove this for
NE profiles f˜ (n)(K\K0). By (29), (27) and (28), we obtain for each a ∈ A
that
τ (1,n)a
(
f˜ (n)a (K\K0)
)
= τ (1,n)a
(
T1(d
(n))
f˜
(n)
a (K\K0)
T1(d(n))
)
∈ O(max{g(0)n , T1(d(n))ρa}).
where we observe that f˜
(n)
a (K\K0)
T1(d(n))
∈ O(1), since
lim
n→∞
f˜
(n)
a (K\K0)
T1(d(n))
= f˜
(1,∞)
a ∈ O(1).
Let k ∈ K1 be an arbitrarily fixed group. For each strategy s ∈ Sk, we
obtain by the above discussion that the price of s w.r.t. the NE profiles
f˜ (n)(K\K0) and the marginal games Γ(1,n)τ are in
O
(
max{g(0)n , T1(d(n))ρs}
)
.
By the user optimality (2) of NE profiles, we then obtain that the cost L˜
(n)
k
of users in each group k ∈ K1 is in
O
(
max{g(0)n , T1(d(n))ρk}
)
⊆ O
(
max{g(0)n , g(1)n }
)
,
since ρs ≥ ρk and ρk ≤ α1 for each s ∈ Sk and k ∈ K1.
An almost identical argument carries over to the NE profiles f ∗(n)(K\K0)
w.r.t. the marginal games Γ
(1,n)
c . This completes the proof.
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With Claim 3, we can now prove (19) for m = 1. To this end, we make
the further assumption that
lim
n→∞
g
(1)
n
g
(0)
n
= lim
n→∞
T1(d
(n))α1
T0(d(n))α0
= β0,
for some constant β0 ∈ [0,∞]. Otherwise, one can take a subsequence fulfill-
ing this condition.
Claim 4.
lim
n→∞
∑
k∈⋃1u=0Ku Ck(f˜ (n))∑
k∈⋃1u=0Ku Ck(f ∗(n)) = 1.
Moreover,∑
k∈⋃1u=0Ku
Ck(f˜
(n)),
∑
k∈⋃1u=0Ku
Ck(f
∗(n)) ∈ Θ(max{T0(d(n))α0+1, T1(d(n))α1+1})
= Θ
(
max{T0(d(n)) · g(0)n , T1(d(n)) · g(1)n }
)
.
Proof of Claim 4. We separate the discussion into two cases.
(Case 1: β0 <∞) In this case, the total cost of the groups from K1 are
negligible w.r.t. the total cost of the groups from K0. By Claim 2, see (24)
and (25), we obtain for large enough n that∑
k∈K0
Ck(f˜
(n)) ≈
∑
k∈K0
Ck(f
∗(n)) ∈ Θ(T0(d(n)) · g(0)n ).
With Claim 3, we obtain that∑
k∈K1
Ck(f˜
(n)) =
∑
k∈K1
d
(n)
k · L˜(n)k ∈ O
(
T1(d
(n)) · g(0)n
)
,
since g
(1)
n ∈ O(g(0)n ) in this case.
Note that
τa(f
∗(n)
a ) ∈ Θ
(
ca(f
∗(n)
a )
)
and ca(f
∗(n)
a ) = c
(1,n)
a
(
f ∗(n)a (K\K0)
)
for each a ∈ A. Thus, again by Claim 3, we obtain∑
k∈K1
Ck(f
∗(n)) ∈ Θ
( ∑
k∈K1
d
(n)
k · L∗(n)k
)
⊆ O(T1(d(n)) · g(0)n ).
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Since T1(d
(n)) ∈ o(T0(d(n))), we obtain that∑
k∈K1
Ck(f˜
(n)) ∈ o
( ∑
k∈K0
Ck(f˜
(n))
)
and
∑
k∈K1
Ck(f
∗(n)) ∈ o
( ∑
k∈K0
Ck(f
∗(n))
)
.
This gives
lim
n→∞
∑
k∈⋃1u=0Ku Ck(f˜ (n))∑
k∈⋃1u=0Ku Ck(f ∗(n)) = limn→∞
∑
k∈K0 Ck(f˜
(n))∑
k∈K0 Ck(f
∗(n))
= 1.
With Claim 2, we obtain that∑
k∈⋃1u=0Ku
Ck(f˜
(n)),
∑
k∈⋃1u=0Ku
Ck(f
∗(n)) ∈ Θ(max{T0(d(n)) ·g(0)n , T1(d(n)) ·g(1)n }),
since g
(1)
n ∈ O(g(0)n ) and T1(d(n)) ∈ o(T0(d(n))).
(Case 2: β0 =∞) In this case, we can use a similar argument as in the
proof of Claim 2 to show that
lim
n→∞
∑
k∈K1 Ck(f˜
(n))∑
k∈K1 Ck(f
∗(n))
= 1.
To this end, we need to look more closely into the price functions τ
(1,n)
a (·)
and c
(1,n)
a (·).
Let a ∈ A be an arbitrarily fixed resource. We aim to show that the price
of a is asymptotically determined only by users from groups k ∈ K1 under
the assumption that β0 = ∞ and the scaling factor is g(1)n = T1(d(n))α1 for
each n ∈ N.
If ρa < α1, then we obtain by (27) and (28) that the limit
lim
n→∞
τ
(1,n)
a (T1(d
(n))x)
g
(1)
n
= 0, (30)
for each x > 0, since g
(0)
n ∈ o(g(1)n ) and
τ (1,n)a (T1(d
(n))x)∈O
(
max
{
g(0)n , T1(d
(n))ρa
})⊆o(g(1)n ).
If ρa ≥ α1, then we obtain by the definition of τ (1,n)a (·) and (29) that the
limit
lim
n→∞
τ
(1,n)
a (T1(d
(n))x)
g
(1)
n
= lim
n→∞
τa(T1(d
(n))x)
T1(d(n))α1
, (31)
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exists for all x ≥ 0. Here we observe that
τa
(
f˜ (n)a (K0)
) ∈ O(g(0)n ) ⊆ o(g(1)n ).
Similarly, we obtain that for each x > 0 and each a ∈ A with ρa ≥ α1, the
limit
lim
n→∞
c
(1,n)
a (T1(d
(n))x)
g
(1)
n
= lim
n→∞
ca(T1(d
(n))x)
g
(1)
n
exists. Then, (30) and (31) yield for each x > 0 and a ∈ A that
lim
n→∞
τ
(1,n)
a (T1(d
(n))x)
g
(1)
n
=: τ (1,∞)a (x) =

0, if ρa < α1,
ba · (α1 + 1)xα1 , if ρa = α1,
∞, if ρa > α1,
lim
n→∞
c
(1,n)
a (T1(d
(n))x)
g
(1)
n
=: c(1,∞)a (x) =

0, if ρa < α1,
ba · (α1 + 1)xα1 , if ρa = α1,
∞, if ρa > α1,
(32)
where, again, ba > 0 is the coefficient of the term x
α1 of polynomial τa(·), if
τa(·) does have degree α1, for each a ∈ A. Notice that (32) actually indicates
that users from groups k ∈ K\⋃1u=0Ku can be ignored when we discuss
the limit behavior of users from groups k ∈ K1, since their total volume is
negligible compared to that of users from groups k ∈ K1.
By (32), with an argument similar to that for Claim 2, we can show that
f ∗(1,∞) :=
(
f ∗(1,∞)s
)
k∈K1:s∈Sk and f˜
(1,∞)
:=
(
f˜
(1,∞)
s
)
k∈K1:s∈Sk
are NE profiles w.r.t. the limit marginal games
Γ(1,∞)τ :=
(K1,A,⋃
k∈K1
Sk,(r(a, s))a∈A,s∈Sk,k∈K1 ,(τ (1,∞)a )a∈A,(d(1,∞)k )k∈K1
)
and
Γ(1,∞)c :=
(K1,A,⋃
k∈K1
Sk,(r(a, s))a∈A,s∈Sk,k∈K1 ,(c(1,∞)a )a∈A,(d(1,∞)k )k∈K1
)
,
respectively.
Moreover, we can show that
lim
n→∞
∑
k∈K1 Ck(f˜
(n))
T1(d) · g(1)n
=
∑
k∈K1
∑
s∈Sk:ρs≤α1
f˜
(1,∞)
s ·
∑
a∈A
r(a, s)τ (1,∞)a (f˜
(1,∞)
a ) ∈ Θ(1)
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and
lim
n→∞
∑
k∈K1 Ck(f
∗(n))
T1(d) · g(1)n
=
∑
k∈K1
∑
s∈Sk:ρs≤α1
f ∗(1,∞)s ·
∑
a∈A
r(a, s)τ (1,∞)a (f
∗(1,∞)
a ) ∈ Θ(1).
Note that there exists at least one group k ∈ K1, such that d(1,∞)k > 0 and
ρk = α1. Therefore,∑
k∈K1
∑
s∈Sk:ρs≤α1 f˜
(1,∞)
s ·
∑
a∈A r(a, s)τ
(1,∞)
a (f˜
(1,∞)
a )∑
k∈K1
∑
s∈Sk:ρs≤α1 f
∗(1,∞)
s ·
∑
a∈A r(a, s)τ
(1,∞)
a (f
∗(1,∞)
a )
= 1,
since the two games Γ
(1,∞)
τ and Γ
(1,∞)
c have the same NE profiles, the numer-
ator is the cost of the NE profile f˜
(1,∞)
, and the denominator is the cost of
the cost of the NE profile f ∗(1,∞).
As a result, we obtain that
lim
n→∞
∑
k∈K1 Ck(f˜
(n))∑
k∈K1 Ck(f
∗(n))
= 1,
which, in turn, implies by Claim 2 that
lim
n→∞
∑
k∈⋃1u=0Ku Ck(f˜ (n))∑
k∈⋃1u=0Ku Ck(f ∗(n)) = 1.
This completes the proof of Claim 4.
Consequently,∑
k∈K1
Ck(f˜
(n)) ≈
∑
k∈K1
Ck(f
∗(n)) ∈ Θ
(
T1(d
(n)) · g(1)n
)
.
With Claim 2, we then further obtain that∑
k∈⋃1u=0Ku
Ck(f˜
(n)),
∑
k∈⋃1u=0Ku
Ck(f
∗(n)) ∈ Θ(max{T0(d(n))g(0)n , T1(d(n))g(1)n }).
If K = K0 ∪ K1, then we have already finished the decomposition and
completed the whole proof with Claim 4. Otherwise, we can continue with
an argument similar to those at steps m = 0, 1. Note that this procedure will
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eventually terminate, since the number |K| = K of groups is finite. We now
outline the general inductive step m = l for some integer l = 0, . . . , K.
Step m = l : construct Kl, and prove (19) for m = l.
We assume that we have partitioned K into K0, . . . ,Kl−1,K\
⋃l−1
u=0Ku for
some integer l = 0, . . . , K, where we use a convention that
⋃−1
u=0Ku = ∅, and
K−1 = ∅. Moreover, we make the following inductive assumptions.
IA1. The limit
lim
n→∞
Tu+1(d
(n))
Tu(d(n))
= 0, and lim
n→∞
∑
k∈Kl−1 d
(n)
k
Tl−1
= 1,
for each u = 0, 1, . . . , l−2, where each Tu(d(n)) =
∑
k∈K\⋃u−1i=0 Ki d(n)k , for
each n ∈ N for u = 0, . . . , l − 1.
IA2. Define
αu := max{ρk : k ∈ Ku}
for each u = 0, 1, . . . , l − 1.
IA3. For each k ∈ ⋃l−1u=0Ku,
L˜
(n)
k , L
∗(n)
k ∈ O
(
max{g(0)n , . . . , g(l−1)n }
)
,
where each g
(u)
n = Tu(d
(n))αu , for u = 0, . . . , l − 1.
IA4. For each u = 0, . . . , l − 1,
lim
n→∞
∑
k∈⋃ui=0Ki Ck
(
f˜ (n)
)∑
k∈⋃ui=0Ki Ck
(
f ∗(n)
) = 1,
and ∑
k∈⋃ui=0Ki
Ck
(
f ∗(n)
)
,
∑
k∈⋃ui=0Ki
Ck
(
f˜ (n)
)
∈ Θ
(
max{T0(d(n))g(0)n , . . . , Tu(d(n))g(u)n }
)
.
Note that we only need to check the validity of IA3-IA4 at each step.
IA1 follows immediately from the definition of total user volumes Tu(d
(n)) of
the marginals, and IA2 defines the “degree” of each Ku for u = 0, . . . , l − 1.
Again, if
⋃l−1
u=0Ku = K, then we have already finished the decomposition
and completed the proof. Otherwise, we can apply an argument similar to
55
those above. Due to the heavy similarity, we now only list the key components
at this general step m = l, but omit the detailed proof.
Similarly we need the following assumptions:
• The limit
lim
n→∞
d
(n)
k
Tl(d(n))
=: d
(l,∞)
k ∈ [0, 1]
exists for each k ∈ K\⋃l−1u=0Ku, where Tl(d(n)) = ∑k∈K\⋃l−1u=0Ku d(n)k .
• The limit
lim
n→∞
f˜
(n)
s
Tl(d(n))
=: f˜
(l,∞)
s and lim
n→∞
f
∗(n)
s
Tl(d(n))
=: f ∗(l,∞)s
exist for some constants f˜
(l,∞)
s ,f
∗(l,∞)
s ∈ [0, 1] for each s ∈ Sk, and each
k ∈ K\⋃l−1u=0Ku.
Otherwise, we can again take an infinite subsequence to fulfill these assump-
tions.
Similarly, we define
αl := max
{
ρk : k ∈ K\
l−1⋃
u=0
Ku,d(l,∞)k > 0
}
,
and put
Kl :=
{
k ∈ K\
l−1⋃
u=0
Ku : ρk ≤ αl
}
.
Obviously, Kl, αl and Tl(d(n)) together validate IA1-IA2 for step m = l.
Moreover, there exists k ∈ Kl such that d(1,∞)k > 0 and ρk = αl.
Similarly, we put
τ (l,n)a (x) := τa
(
x+ f˜ (n)a (
l−1⋃
u=0
Ku)
)
and
c(l,n)a (x) := ca
(
x+ f ∗(n)a (
l−1⋃
u=0
Ku)
)
,
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be the price functions under the condition that users from groups in
⋃l−1
u=0Ku
stick to the strategies they used in NE profiles f˜ (n) and SO profiles f ∗(n),
respectively, for each n ∈ N and each a ∈ A. Here
f˜ (n)a (
l−1⋃
u=0
Ku) :=
∑
k∈⋃l−1u=0Ku
∑
s∈Sk
r(a, s) · f˜ (n)s
and
f ∗(n)a (
l−1⋃
u=0
Ku) :=
∑
k∈⋃l−1u=0Ku
∑
s∈Sk
r(a, s) · f ∗(n)s
are the volumes of resource a consumed by users from groups ∈ ⋃l−1u=0Ku
w.r.t. the profiles f˜ (n) and f ∗(n), respectively, for each n ∈ N and each
a ∈ A.
Obviously,
τa(f˜
(n)
a ) = τ
(1,n)
a
(
f˜ (n)a
(K\ l−1⋃
u=0
Ku
))
and ca(f
∗(n)
a ) = c
(1,n)
a
(
f ∗(n)a
(K\ l−1⋃
u=0
Ku
))
for each n ∈ N, and each resource a ∈ A. Here
f˜ (n)a
(K\ l−1⋃
u=0
Ku
)
:= f˜ (n)a − f˜ (n)a
( l−1⋃
u=0
Ku
)
=
∑
k∈K\⋃l−1u=0Ku
∑
s∈Sk
r(a, s) · f˜s
denotes the volume of resource a consumed by users from groups k ∈ K\⋃l−1u=0Ku
w.r.t. NE profile f˜ (n). This yields similarly for f
∗(n)
a
(K\⋃l−1u=0Ku).
By the inductive assumption IA3 and a simlar argument to the proof of
Claim 3, we obtain for each a ∈ A that
τa
(
f˜ (n)a
( l−1⋃
u=0
Ku
)) ∈ O(max{g(0)n , . . . , g(l−1)n })
and
ca
(
f ∗(n)a
( l−1⋃
u=0
Ku
)) ∈ O(max{g(0)n , . . . , g(l−1)n }).
Since both τa(·) and ca(·) are asymptotically non-decreasing, we thus obtain
that
c(1,n)a
(
Tl(d
(n))x
)
, τ (1,n)a
(
Tl(d
(n))x
)
∈O
(
max
{
Tl(d
(n))ρa , g(0)n , . . . , g
(l−1)
n
})
for each a ∈ A and each x ≥ 0. An argument similar to that for Claim 3 the
gives:
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Claim 5. For each k ∈ Kl,
L˜
(n)
k , L
∗(n)
k ∈ O
(
max{g(0)n , . . . , g(l)n }
)
,
where g
(l)
n = Tl(d
(n))αl .
Claim 5 validates the inductive assumption IA3 for step m = l.
To validate the inductive assumption IA4 for step m = l, we assume that
the limit
lim
n→∞
g
(n)
l
max{g(0)n , . . . , g(l−1)n }
= βl−1 ∈ [0,∞]
exists for some constant βl−1. In the case that βl−1 < ∞, we obtain that
g
(l)
n ∈ O
(
max{g(0)n , . . . , g(l−1)n }
)
, which implies that groups ∈ Kl are negligible
w.r.t. groups ∈ ⋃l−1u=0Ku, since Tl(d(n)) ∈ o(Tl−1(d(n))). Hence, if βl−1 < ∞,
then IA4 is valid for step m = l.
In the case that βl−1 =∞, we obtain that g(l)n ∈ ω
(
max{g(0)n , . . . , g(l−1)n }
)
,
which implies that the behavior of users from groups Kl is asymptotically
independent of users from groups
⋃l−1
u=0Ku. Then, an argument similar to
that for Claim 4 applies. This yields Claim 6 below, and validates IA4 for
step m = l.
Claim 6.
lim
n→∞
∑
k∈⋃li=0Ki Ck
(
f˜ (n)
)∑
k∈⋃li=0Ki Ck
(
f ∗(n)
) = 1,
and∑
k∈⋃li=0Ki
Ck
(
f ∗(n)
)
,
∑
k∈⋃li=0Ki
Ck
(
f˜ (n)
) ∈ Θ(max{T0(d(n))g(0)n , . . . , Tl(d(n))g(l)n }).
All above together validate the inductive assumptions IA1-IA4 for step
m = l. So the induction completes, and Theorem 2 is proved.
Proof of Lemma 8
Proof of Lemma 8. A proof of Lemma 8 may already exist in [3]. However,
we cannot directly access [3]. Our knowledge on regular variation is actually
indirectly obtained from Wikipedia on the page
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slowly varying function.
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Therefore, we supply a detailed proof to ensure completeness of this paper.
Proof of a) : Let  > 0 be an arbitrarily fixed constant. Using Kara-
mata’s Characterization Theorem and Representation Theorem, see, e.g., [3],
we can write
τ(x) = xρ · eη(x)+
∫ x
b
ξ(t)
t
dt,
where
• η(x) is a real-valued measurable function such that limx→∞ η(x) = p
for some constant p ≥ 0,
• b ≥ 0 is a constant, and ξ(x) is a real-valued measurable function such
that limx→∞ ξ(x) = 0.
Thus, we obtain that
lim
x→∞
τ(x)
xρ+
= lim
x→∞
e−·lnx+η(x)+
∫ x
b
ξ(t)
t
dt = lim
x→∞
e−
∫ x
1

t
dt+p+
∫ x
b
ξ(t)
t
dt
= lim
x→∞
e−
∫ x
1
−ξ(t)
t
dt+p+
∫ 1
b
ξ(t)
t
dt = 0,
where we observe that
lim
x→∞
∫ x
1
− ξ(t)
t
dt =∞,
since ξ(t)→ 0 as t→∞, and  > 0.
Similarly, one can prove that
lim
x→∞
τ(x)
xρ−
=∞.
Proof of b) : For each x > 0,
lim
t→∞
g(tx)
g(t)
= lim
t→∞
g(tx)
τ(tx)
g(t)
τ(t)
· lim
t→∞
τ(tx)
τ(t)
= xρ.
Proof of c) : For each x > 0,
lim
t→∞
g(tx)
τ(tx)
g(t)
τ(t)
= lim
t→∞
g(tx)
g(t)
· lim
t→∞
1
τ(tx)
τ(t)
= xρ
′ · x−ρ = xρ′−ρ ∈ (0,∞).
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Proof of Lemma 9
Proof of Lemma 9. We assume that τ(x) is nondecreasing, non-negative, con-
vex, differentiable and regularly varying with index ρ ∈ R.
We first show that ρ ≥ 0. Since τ(·) is convex,
τ
(
(1 + η)x
)
= τ
(
(1− η) · x+ η · 2x
)
≤ (1− η)τ(x) + ητ(2x)
for each x ≥ 0 and each η ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore,
τ
(
(1 + η)x
)
τ(x)
≤ 1− η + ητ(2x)
τ(x)
for each x with τ(x) > 0. Letting x → ∞, we obtain from the regular
variation of τ(·) that (
1 + η
)ρ ≤ 1− η + η · 2ρ (33)
for each η ∈ [0, 1], which, in turn, implies that ρ ≥ 0. Otherwise, if ρ < 0,
then
∂
∂η
(
1− η + η · 2ρ − (1 + η)ρ) = 2ρ − 1− ρ(1 + η)ρ−1 < 0,
when
0 ≤ η <
( ρ
2ρ − 1
) 1
1−ρ − 1 ∈ (0, 1).
Therefore, if ρ < 0, then we obtain for these η that
1− η + η · 2ρ − (1 + η)ρ < 1− 0 + 0 · 2ρ − (1 + 0)ρ = 0,
which contradicts (33).
So, convexity of τ(·) implies that ρ ≥ 0.
Convexity and differentiability of τ(·) further imply for each t > 0 and
x > 0 that
1
t
x · τ ′(x) ≤
∫ (1+ 1
t
)
x
x
τ ′(u)du = τ
((
1 +
1
t
)
x
)
− τ(x).
Therefore,
x · τ ′(x)
tτ(x)
≤
(τ((1 + 1
t
)x
)
τ(x)
− 1
)
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for each t > 0 and x > 0. Letting x→∞, the regular variation of τ(x) yields
lim
x→∞
xτ ′(x)
τ(x)
≤ t
((
1 +
1
t
)ρ − 1)
for each t > 0. Note that ρ ≥ 0 implies that
lim
t→∞
t
((
1 +
1
t
)ρ − 1) = lim
z→0
(1 + z)ρ − 1
z
= ρ.
So, altogether, if τ(·) is convex and differentiable, then
lim
x→∞
xτ ′(x)
τ(x)
≤ ρ.
Similarly, using again the convexity and differentiability of τ, we obtain
for each t > 1 and each x > 0 that
1
t
xτ ′(x) ≥
∫ x(
1− 1
t
)
x
τ ′(u)du = τ(x)− τ
((
1− 1
t
)
x
)
.
An almost identical argument to the above then yields
lim
x→∞
xτ ′(x)
τ(x)
≥ lim
z→0
1− (1− z)ρ
z
= ρ.
Altogether, we obtain that
lim
x→∞
xτ ′(x)
τ(x)
= ρ ≥ 0,
which completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 3
Proof of Theorem 3. The proof is similar to that for Theorem 2. To save
space, we only sketch the main idea and give details for some crucial points.
Consider an arbitrary sequence {d(n)}n∈N of user volume vectors such that
limn→∞ T (d(n)) =∞, and consider an NE profile f˜ (n) and an SO profile f ∗(n)
for each n ∈ N. We want to apply the asymptotic decomposition to this
sequence. The Theorem will follow directly from the arbitrary choice of the
sequence {d(n)}n∈N.
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To construct suitable scaling factors at each inductive step, we now aim to
define a suitable ordering  on the set A of resources. Note that the degrees
of the polynomial price functions serve as such an ordering in the proof of
Theorem 2. Here, the τa(·) are generally no longer polynomials, thus such
an ordering is not so obvious.
Let ρa denote the regular variation index of τa(·) for each a ∈ A. Note
that the “degrees” ρa now cannot be used directly as such an ordering on
the set A. We instead use the mutual comparability of the price functions to
define a suitable ordering  on the set A. We put
a  b ⇐⇒ lim
x→∞
τa(x)
τb(x)
= qa,b <∞.
Obviously, by Lemma 8, ρa < ρb implies that a  b. But the inverse need not
be true.
This ordering on A also carries over to the case that the price functions
are ca(x) = xτ
′
a(x) + τa(x). By Lemma 9 and Lemma 8, and the convexity
of each τa(·), we obtain immediately for each a ∈ A that ca(·) is also regular
varying with the same index ρa, and
lim
x→∞
ca(x)
τa(x)
= ρa + 1.
For each s ∈ S, let a¯s be a maximum element of {a ∈ A : r(a, s) > 0}
w.r.t. the ordering  . Then, we obtain by the mutual comparability that
qa¯s,a¯′s = limx→∞
τa¯s(x)
τa¯′s(x)
∈ (0,∞),
where a¯′s is another maximum element of {a ∈ A : r(a, s) > 0} w.r.t. the
ordering  . This means that these maximum elements are mutually equiv-
alent w.r.t. the ordering  . Hence, by Lemma 8, two maximum elements
of {a ∈ A : r(a, s) > 0} have the same regular variation index. Again, the
inverse need not be true.
With the ordering , we can now easily identify the cheapest strategy s∗k
for each group k ∈ K. Obviously, s∗k is a strategy s ∈ Sk such that a¯s  a¯s′
for each s′ ∈ Sk.
The ordering  on resource set A are crucial for the construction of the
scaling factors of the marginal games at each inductive step in the asymptotic
decomposition.
step m = 0 : Construct K0 and the scaling factors g(0)n
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Let us put T0(d
(n)) = T (d(n)) for each n ∈ N.
Similar to the proof of Theorem 2, we assume w.l.o.g. that the limits
lim
n→∞
d
(n)
k
T0(d(n))
=d
(0,∞)
k , f˜
(0,∞)
s = lim
n→∞
f˜
(n)
s
T0(d(n))
, and f ∗(0,∞)s = lim
n→∞
f
∗(n)
s
T0(d(n))
exist for each k ∈ K and s ∈ S. We put α0 = max{a¯s∗k : k ∈ K,d
(0,∞)
k >
0} ∈ A, where the maximization is w.r.t. the ordering  . Note that if there
are multiple maxima, then we can pick arbitrary one of them. Moreover, we
put K0 = {k ∈ K : a¯s∗k  α0}, and g
(0)
n = τα0
(
T0(d
(n))
)
for each n ∈ N.
With the user optimality (2), we can easily obtain for each k ∈ K0 that
L˜
(n)
k , L
∗(n)
k ∈ O
(
g(0)n
)
= O
(
τα0(T0(d
(n)))
)
,
since there exists an strategy s ∈ Sk such that a¯s  α0 for each k ∈ K0, and
the maximum volume of users adopting a strategy is in O(T0(d
(n))).
With the regular variation of the price functions τa(·) and ca(·), we obtain
for each x > 0 that
lim
n→∞
τa(T (d
(n))x)
g
(0)
n
= lim
n→∞
τa(T (d
(n))x)
τα0(T (d
(n)))
= qa,α0 · xα0 ,
and
lim
n→∞
ca(T (d
(n))x)
g
(0)
n
= lim
n→∞
ca(T (d
(n))x)
τα0(T (d
(n)))
= (1 + ρα0)qa,α0 · xα0 .
Therefore, we can then obtain from an argument similar to that for Claim 2
that ∑
k∈K0
Ck(f˜
(n)) ≈
∑
k∈K0
Ck(f
∗(n)) ∈ Θ(T0(d(n))g(0)n ).
Here, we observe that there exists at least one group k ∈ K0 such that
a¯s∗k = α0 and d
(0,∞)
k > 0.
step m = l : Construct Kl and scaling factors g(l)n
Similar to the proof of Theorem 2, we now make inductive assumptions
that we have constructed K0, . . . ,Kl−1 and g(0)n , . . . , g(l−1)n such that for each
k ∈ ⋃l−1u=0Ku
L˜
(n)
k , L
∗(n)
k ∈ O
(
max{g(0)n , . . . , g(l−1)n }
)
,
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and ∑
k∈⋃l−1u=0Ku
Ck(f˜
(n)) ≈
∑
k∈⋃l−1u=0Ku
Ck(f
∗(n))
∈ Θ(max{T0(d(n))g(0)n , . . . , Tl−1(d(n))g(l−1)n }).
Moreover, we assume for each u = 0, . . . , l − 2 that
lim
n→∞
Tu+1(d
(n))
Tu(d(n))
= 0, and lim
n→∞
∑
k∈K\⋃l−1i=0Ki d(n)k
Tl−1(d(n))
= 0.
To construct Kl and g(l)n , we make a further assumption that the limits
lim
n→∞
d
(n)
k
Tl(d(n))
= d
(l,∞)
k , limn→∞
f˜
(n)
s
Tl(d(n))
= f˜
(l,∞)
s , and lim
n→∞
f
∗(n)
s
Tl(d(n))
= f ∗(l,∞)s
exist for each s ∈ Sk and k ∈ K\
⋃l−1
u=0Ku, where Tl(d(n)) =
∑
k∈K\⋃l−1u=0Ku d(n)k
for each n ∈ N.
Let αl = max{a¯s∗k : k ∈ K\
⋃l−1
u=0Ku,d(l,∞)k > 0} and Kl = {k ∈
K\⋃l−1u=0Ku : a¯s∗k  αl}. Then, we put g(l)n = ταl(Tl(d(n))).
Similarly, we can obtain for each k ∈ Kl that
L˜
(n)
k , L
∗(n)
k ∈ O
(
max{g(0)n , . . . , g(l)n }
)
,
since both τa(·) and ca(·) are non-decreasing, and thus for each a ∈ A and
each x > 0
τ (l,n)a
(
Tl(d
(n))x
)
= τa
(
Tl(d
(n))x+ f˜ (n)a (
l−1⋃
u=0
Ku)
)
∈ O(max{τa(Tl(d(n))), τa(f˜ (n)a ( l−1⋃
u=0
Ku))}
)
and
c(l,n)a
(
Tl(d
(n))x
)
= ca
(
Tl(d
(n))x+ f ∗(n)a (
l−1⋃
u=0
Ku)
)
∈ O(max{ca(Tl(d(n))), ca(f ∗(n)a ( l−1⋃
u=0
Ku))}
)
.
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So, if g
(l)
n ∈ O
(
max{g(0)n , . . . , g(l−1)n }
)
, then all groups in Kl are negligible
w.r.t. groups
⋃l−1
u=0Ku. Otherwise, g(l)n ∈ ω
(
max{g(0)n , . . . , g(l−1)n }
)
. If this is
the case, we can then independently consider Kl with an argument similar
to that for Theorem 2. This will yield∑
k∈⋃lu=0Ku
Ck(f˜
(n)) ≈
∑
k∈⋃lu=0Ku
Ck(f
∗(n))
∈ Θ(max{T0(d(n))g(0)n , . . . , Tl−1(d(n))g(l−1)n , Tl(d(n))g(l)n }),
which completes the induction and finishes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 4
Proof of Theorem 4. This proof is very similar to those for Theorem 2 and
Theorem 3. We thus only sketch the main idea.
Note that we will not need a suitable ordering on resources in this proof.
Conditions G1′)-G3′) have already guaranteed the existence of a suitable
scaling factor sequence {g(l)n }n∈N at each inductive step.
We assume that we are now at an inductive step m = l, and we have
already shown that for each k ∈ ⋃l−1u=0Ku
L˜
(n)
k , L
∗(n)
k ∈ O
(
max{g(0)n , . . . , g(l−1)n }
)
,
and ∑
k∈⋃l−1u=0Ku
Ck(f˜
(n)) ≈
∑
k∈⋃l−1u=0Ku
Ck(f
∗(n))
∈ Θ(max{T0(d(n))g(0)n , . . . , Tl−1(d(n))g(l−1)n }),
where all the notations are the same as those for the proofs of Theorem 2
and Theorem 3. Moreover, we make the further inductive assumptions that
lim
n→∞
Tu+1(d
(n))
Tu(d(n))
= 0, and lim
n→∞
∑
k∈K\⋃l−1u=0Ku d(n)k
Tl−1(d(n))
= 0
for each u = 0, . . . , l− 2. If K = ⋃l−1u=0Ku, then we terminate. Otherwise, we
continue as follows.
We define Kl = {k ∈ K\
⋃l−1
u=0Ku : d(l,∞)k > 0}, where all d(l,∞)k are
again defined similarly as in the proofs of Theorem 2 and Theorem 3. The
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condition of Theorem 4 implies that there is a regularly varying function g(·)
for Kl such that G1′)-G3′) hold. We put g(l)n = g(Tl(d(n))), where we put
again Tl(d
(n)) =
∑
k∈Kl d
(n)
k for each n ∈ N.
Then, by the user optimality (2) and conditions G1′)-G2′), we can simi-
larly obtain for each k ∈ Kl that
L˜
(n)
k , L
∗(n)
k ∈ O
(
max{g(0)n , . . . , g(l)n }
)
,
since τa(x) is non-decreasing, (11) and thus ca(x) = xτ
′
a(x)+τa(x) are asymp-
totically non-decreasing for each a ∈ A. By comparing g(l)n with max{g(0)n , . . . , g(l−1)n },
we can again obtain with conditions (11) and G3′) that∑
k∈⋃lu=0Ku
Ck(f˜
(n)) ≈
∑
k∈⋃lu=0Ku
Ck(f
∗(n))
∈ Θ(max{T0(d(n))g(0)n , . . . , Tl−1(d(n))g(l−1)n , Tl(d(n))g(l)n }),
which validates the inductive assumption at step m = l.
Therefore, the game is asymptotic decomposable and asymptotically well
designed.
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